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A LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. NEWS LAW
SCHOOL ACADEMIC REPUTATION SCORES
BETWEEN 1998 AND 2013
ROBERT L. JONES*
ABSTRACT
This Article summarizes the results of a longitudinal study of the U.S. News academic
reputation scores (“peer assessment scores”) for 172 law schools between 1998 and
2013. Among other things, the study reveals that there has been a significant downward trend
in the academic reputation scores of law schools since 1998. Over 60% of the law schools in the
data set finished the sixteen-year period with academic reputation scores that were lower than
the ones with which they began in 1998. Less than 20% of the law schools in the data set managed to finish the period with academic reputation scores that were higher (even by .1) than the
ones with which they began in 1998. In addition, the study found that the declines in academic
reputation scores tended to be inversely correlated to the strength of the schools’ academic reputation scores and U.S. News ranks. The schools that started the period with the highest academic reputation scores posted the largest declines as a group while the law schools that started with the lowest academic reputation scores experienced the most success in maintaining
their scores. These trends strongly suggest that the U.S. News rankings themselves are influencing the way academics evaluate their competing institutions in the survey process, a fact
that raises important normative questions about whether the academic reputation scores
should figure so prominently in the U.S. News methodology.
As part of the study, furthermore, the law school academic reputation scores for the sixteen-year period were analyzed to determine whether there has been an “echo effect” between
the law schools’ academic reputation scores and their overall U.S. News ranks. The empirical
analysis suggests that a law school’s U.S. News rank does tend to influence its academic reputation score, particularly in instances where a law school is consistently “under-” or “overranked” relative to its academic reputation score. The Article concludes with an identification
of those law schools whose academic reputation scores have improved or declined the
most during the sixteen-year period, along with a brief discussion of some potential causes for
those changes.
I.
II.

III.
IV.

INTRODUCTION & METHODOLOGY ...................................................................
GENERAL FINDINGS .........................................................................................
A. Volatility of Academic Reputation Score..................................................
B. Downward Trend in Academic Reputation Scores ..................................
C. The Academic Reputation Score Results for 2013 ...................................
D. Comparison of Academic Reputation Scores to Reputation Scores
Formulated by Lawyers and Judges........................................................
E. Correlation Between Downward Trend in Academic Reputation Scores
and Strength of U.S. News Ranks and Academic Reputation Scores .....
F. Disparity Between Public and Private Law Schools ................................
THE ECHO EFFECT ..........................................................................................
LAW SCHOOLS THAT EXPERIENCED THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO
THEIR ACADEMIC REPUTATION SCORES DURING THE STUDIED PERIOD .........

722
726
726
728
733
737
741
753
759
773

* Associate Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University, College of Law. J.D.,
New York University School of Law; A.B., University of California, Berkeley. I would like
to thank Wendy Vaughn, Yolanda King, Morse Tan, Jeremy Telman, Elvia Arriola, Brian
Tamanaha, Daniel Schneider, Laurel Rigertas, Marc Falkoff, David Gaebler, and Marijo
Gallina. I would also like to thank Aaron Gott, Michael Teevin, and the editorial staff at
the Florida State University Law Review for their fine editing.

722

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

V.

[Vol. 40:721

A. Law Schools that Experienced Most Significant Declines .......................
B. Law Schools that Experienced Most Significant Gains ...........................
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................

773
778
786

I. INTRODUCTION & METHODOLOGY
The U.S. News & World Report (“U.S. News”) began its current
practice of ranking law schools in 1990.1 Despite many criticisms
from legal academics that the rankings are misleading and counterproductive,2 it is undeniable that the U.S. News rankings now play a
1. The U.S. News & World Report first generated a ranking for law schools in 1987.
Richard Schmalbeck, The Durability of Law School Reputation, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 568, 588
(1998). In its initial foray into the rankings effort, however, the magazine relied exclusively
on a survey of law school deans and relegated its list to the top twenty schools. Id. The
magazine’s 1990 ranking constituted its first effort to utilize multiple criteria based on its
own ranking system. Hyla Bondareff, U.S. News and World Report Ranking Methodology:
The Devil is in the Detail 4 (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research
Paper Series, Paper No. 10-08-01, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1658139.
For a history of the various permutations of the magazine’s methodology regarding law
schools, see id. For a helpful analysis on the U.S. News methodology, see generally Theodore P. Seto, Understanding the U.S. News Law School Rankings, 60 SMU L. REV. 493
(2007); Tom W. Bell, Search Results for Law School Rankings, AGORAPHILIA,
http://agoraphilia.blogspot.com/search/label/law%20school%20rankings (last visited June 5,
2013) (aggregating numerous blog posts under search term “law school rankings”). For a
greater understanding of the 1987 U.S. News ranking and its limitations, see Richard
Schmalbeck, supra, at 588.
2. For critical assessments of the U.S. News rankings and their effects on legal academia, see generally Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Destruction of the Holistic Approach to Admissions: The Pernicious Effects of Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 309 (2006); Brian Leiter, How to
Rank Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 47 (2006); Louis H. Pollak, Why Trying to Rank Law
Schools Numerically is a Non-Productive Undertaking: An Article on the U.S. News &
World Report 2009 List of the “Top 100 Schools,” 1 DREXEL L. REV. 52 (2009); Nancy B.
Rapoport, Ratings, Not Rankings: Why U.S. News & World Report Shouldn’t Want to be
Compared to Time and Newsweek—or The New Yorker, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097 (1999); Michael Sauder & Wendy Nelson Espeland, Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures
Recreate Social Worlds, 113 AM. J. SOC. 1 (2007); Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Interplay Between Law School Rankings, Reputations, and Resource Allocation: Ways Rankings Mislead, 81 IND. L.J. 229 (2006). But see Russell Korobkin, Harnessing the Positive Power of
Rankings: A Response to Posner and Sunstein, 81 IND. L.J. 35, 45 (2006) (“Rankings have
inherent value to students who use them for coordination purposes and therefore to institutions that compete for students.”); Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely, What Law Schools Can
Learn from Billy Beane and the Oakland Athletics, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1522 (2004) (reviewing MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2003)) (observing with approval that “U.S. News & World Report rankings, and the other rankings
that have followed in its wake, are responding to a market demand for greater information
about law schools”).
The limitations of the U.S. News rankings have led a number of scholars to propose
alternative methods for ranking. Brian Leiter, of the University of Chicago Law School, has
conducted a thoughtful array of single factor comparisons between law schools based on a
range of different criteria related to scholarly productivity, the placement success of the
schools with respect to private employers, academia, and clerkships, and the academic
qualifications of the schools’ student bodies. See BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCH. RANKINGS (last
visited June 29, 2013), http://www.leiterrankings.com; see also Bernard S. Black & Paul L.
Caron, Ranking Law Schools: Using SSRN to Measure Scholarly Performance, 81 IND. L.J.
83 (2006) (arguing that SSRN-based measures offer useful mechanism for evaluating
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substantial role in shaping the way American law schools are evaluated by students, alumni, employers, and even many faculty.3
Since their inception, the single most important component of the
U.S. News rankings has been the “peer assessment” score by academics.4 Constituting 25% of each law school’s overall U.S. News ranking,
the peer assessment scores (hereinafter referred to as “academic reputation scores”) are compiled from questionnaires sent to four faculty
members at each ABA accredited law school in the country.5 Approximately 60% to 70% of the surveys are returned each year to U.S.
News with numeric ratings for individual law schools on a scale between one and five, with a score of one denoting a “marginal” institution and a score of five denoting an “outstanding” institution.6
scholarly production of law school faculties); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Ranking and Explaining the Scholarly Impact of Law Schools, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (1998)
(utilizing statistical methods to rank thirty-two law schools based on citations to their faculty’s publications). Jeffrey Stake, of Indiana University Maurer School of Law, maintains
a website that allows visitors to customize the rankings to their own preferences. See Jeffrey E. Stake, The Law School Ranking Game, IND. U. MAURER SCH. L., http://monoborg.
law.indiana.edu/LawRank/index.html (last visited June 29, 2013).
3. See, e.g., William D. Henderson & Andrew P. Morriss, Student Quality as Measured by LSAT Scores: Migration Patterns in the U.S. News Rankings Era, 81 IND. L.J. 163,
165 (2006) (“[W]hether one defends or attacks the U.S. News ranking or its methodology,
virtually everyone within the legal academy agrees that the advent of rankings has dramatically affected how law schools admit students and allocate resources.”); Michael
Sauder & Ryon Lancaster, Do Rankings Matter? The Effects of U.S. News & World Report
Rankings on the Admissions Process of Law Schools, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 105, 105 (2006)
(concluding from empirical analysis of admissions data that U.S. News rankings had “significant effects” on decisions of prospective students on where to matriculate as well as on
decisions by law schools on which students to admit); Michael Sauder & Wendy Nelson
Espeland, Strength in Numbers? The Advantages of Multiple Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 205,
211 (2006) (“[Rankings] have profoundly altered the terms under which law schools are
accountable to their constituents; they influence a broad range of decisions; and they have
changed how many in the legal community make sense of the identity of their own and
others’ schools.”). For helpful discussions of the myriad ways in which law schools have
altered their practices and priorities in response to the U.S. News rankings, see BRIAN Z.
TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 71-103 (2012); Stake, supra note 2, at 232-42.
4. For a discussion of the importance of the academic reputation scores to the U.S.
News methodology, see, for example, Seto, supra note 1, at 515-16.
5. The academic reputation score has accounted for 25% of the overall U.S. News
methodology since 1995. See Bondareff, supra note 1, at 1. The year 1995 also marked
when U.S. News began sending the questionnaires to four members of each ABA accredited
faculty. See id. at 3 (noting that only two members of each law school were polled in the
surveys conducted from 1990 to 1994). Since 1995, the four faculty members selected to
receive the questionnaires have been the dean, the associate dean of academic affairs, the
chair of the appointments committee, and the most recently tenured faculty member. See
Seto, supra note 1, at 497 & n.26. In the surveys themselves, the evaluators are asked to
“rate the academic quality” of the institutions based on “all factors that contribute to or
give evidence of the excellence of the school’s J.D. program, for example, curriculum, record
of scholarship, quality of faculty and graduates.” See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, BEST
GRADUATE SCHOOLS ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF LAW SCHOOLS (2012) (emphasis in original).
6. The 1998 survey was the first to employ the one-to-five scale, with a score of one
intended to denote a “marginal” institution and a top score of five to denote a “distinguished” institution. See Bondareff, supra note 1, at 3. In 2002, U.S. News replaced the
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In light of their central place in the U.S. News methodology, any
effort to understand (or influence) the U.S. News rankings for law
schools requires an appreciation for how the academic reputation
scores function.7 Law schools have expended substantial amounts of
time and money over the last sixteen years to improve their academic
reputation scores.8 Have these resources been well spent? Is it reasonable for a law school to think that its academic reputation score
can be improved over time? If so, how much improvement can a
school reasonably expect to achieve over an extended period? What
kinds of factors might influence the scores and contribute to their
term “distinguished” with “outstanding.” See id. The descriptions for the other numeric
scores currently are: “Adequate” (two); “Good” (three); and “Strong” (four). U.S. News has
confirmed that these three descriptions have not changed since, at least, 1999. See Author’s
Telephone Interview with Samuel Flanigan, Deputy Director of Data Research, U.S. News
& World Report (Sept. 11, 2012). In addition to the one-to-five scale, survey respondents
are given the option of responding “Don’t Know” for each institution. In terms of response
rates, U.S. News reported an overall response rate of 63% for the 2013 rankings (referred
to by U.S. News as the “2014” rankings). Robert Morse & Sam Flanigan, Methodology: Law
School Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/
education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/articles/2013/03/11/methodology-best-lawschools-rankings. The 2013 response rate was relatively low. In prior years, it has been as
high as 71%. See, e.g., Robert Morse, The Law School Rankings Methodology, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.usnews.com/education/articles/2009/04/22/lawschool-rankings-methodology (describing a response rate of 71%). The response rate has
been as low as 62%. See Law: Methodology, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
http://web.archive.org/web/19990427115459/http://www2.usnews.com/usnews/edu/beyond/
gradrank/gblawmet.htm (last visited June 29, 2013) (describing the methodology for the
U.S. News rankings published in 1999).
7. In his statistical analysis of the top fifty law schools for the period between 1998
and 2004, Richard Posner ascertained that the U.S. News ranks were more closely correlated to the reputation scores (academic as well as non-academic) than to other factors such
as LSAT scores and GPA. See Richard A. Posner, Law School Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 13, 15
(2006) (reporting correlation coefficient of .93 for U.S. News rank and academic reputation); see also Brian Leiter, An Open Letter to Bob Morse of U.S. News, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW
SCHOOL REPORTS (Mar. 10, 2010), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2010/03/anopen-lette-1.html (“[I]t is clear to me, and I imagine any other informed observer of school
evaluations, that the reputational surveys are the one component of the U.S. News ranking
that actually keeps the results tethered to reality.”).
8. See, e.g., Seto, supra note 1, at 515 (“U.S. News’s reputational surveys are the
bane of every law dean’s existence. Collectively, law schools spend millions each year on
attempts to influence survey outcomes.”); Larry Cunningham, The Effect of Law School
Marketing Materials on U.S. News & World Report Rankings (St. John’s Univ. Sch. of Law,
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-0019, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2133395. See also Patrick T. O’Day &
George D. Kuh, Assessing What Matters in Law School: The Law School Survey of Student
Engagement, 81 IND. L.J. 401, 404 (2006) (citing John Kirk, Magazines’ Rankings Rankle;
Marketing Tool Draws Fire, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1, 1998, at B1) (reporting some law schools’
spending in excess of $100,000 per year in marketing materials related to the rankings);
Nancy B. Rapoport, Eating Our Cake and Having It, Too: Why Real Change Is So Difficult
in Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 359, 374 (2006) (“The rankings have given law schools some
reasons to want to change, and, certainly, law schools have already changed in response to
the rankings. We send out more written materials, and our publications are timed to coincide with the U.S. News ballots.”).
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rise and fall? More fundamentally, are the academic reputation scores even a legitimate basis upon which to construct a
ranking methodology?
To address these questions and increase understanding of the
ways in which the scores function, the author conducted a longitudinal study of the academic reputation scores for the sixteen-year period between 1998 and 2013.9 The year 1998 was selected for the start
of the study because the current one-to-five scale was adopted by
U.S. News at that time.10 For analysis purposes, a data set was created for all those law schools that received an academic reputation
score for every year during the sixteen-year period (there were 172
such schools). That complete data set is entitled Appendix A.11 Those
schools that did not receive an academic reputation score for every
year during the period between 1998 and 2013 were not included in
the analysis but a table for those schools’ academic reputation scores
during the period is included at the end of Appendix A.12 For the
reader’s convenience, a shorter table containing just the 1998 and
2013 academic reputation scores for the law schools in the data set is
included in Appendix B.13
The results of the study are set out in the following manner. Part
II contains an empirical analysis regarding the volatility of the academic reputation scores and a discussion of the most notable patterns
that characterized the movements of the scores between 1998 and
2013. Part III addresses whether there is a discernible “echo effect”
9. Note that this study refers to the rankings by the years in which they were published by U.S. News, rather than employing the U.S. News practice of naming the rankings
in reference to the subsequent year. When this study refers to the “2013 rankings,” therefore, the reference is to the most recent rankings that were published in March of 2013.
Under the U.S. News nomenclature, by contrast, the “2013 rankings” refers to the rankings
published in March of 2012, and the rankings published in March of 2013 are referred to as
the “2014 rankings.”
10. Prior to 1998, respondents to the U.S. News survey were asked to rank law schools
in quartiles. See Bondareff, supra note 1, at 3. The previous U.S. News methodology for the
reputation scores was so dissimilar that any comparisons between the two periods would
be problematic. For a more complete description of the pre-1998 methodology for the U.S.
News surveys and some the challenges of cross-comparisons, see Schmalbeck, supra note 1,
at 575 n.15, 589-90.
11. See Appendix A, available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/lawreview/ (select
Issues, Past Issues, Vol. 40, Summer 2013).
12. There were twenty-three law schools in this category. The majority of these
schools secured (or re-secured) ABA accreditation during the period of the study. One law
school, St. Thomas University (in Florida), failed to receive an academic reputation score in
2004 as a result of an error by U.S. News. See Schools of Law, America’s Best Graduate
Schools 2004, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Apr. 12, 2004), http://web.ebscohost.com/
ehost/detail?sid=efefe7d4-ab49-4700-98df-fc3fc171bf2e%40sessionmgr110&vid=4&hid=
123&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=a9h&AN=12709625 (describing the
methodology for the “2005 America’s Best Graduate Schools” edition).
13. See Appendix B, available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/lawreview/ (select
Issues, Past Issues, Vol. 40, Summer 2013).
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between a law school’s academic reputation score on the one hand
and its overall U.S. News rank on the other, as has been hypothesized by some academics.14 The study concludes in Part IV with an
identification of those law schools whose academic reputation scores
have changed most significantly since 1998, along with a brief discussion of some of the factors that likely contributed to the changes
for those law schools.
II. GENERAL FINDINGS
A. Volatility of Academic Reputation Score
The data reveals that the academic reputation scores of most law
schools did not change dramatically between 1998 and 2013.15 In order to measure the volatility of the academic reputation scores, the
author computed the standard deviation for each school’s score during the sixteen-year period. In other words, the mean academic reputation score for each law school was determined and then the standard deviation was calculated to provide a measure for the extent to
which that school’s score tended to vary from its mean. The average
absolute variation was also computed for each school to provide an
alternative measure for the extent to which each law school’s score
varied from its mean. The standard deviation and the average absolute variation for each school are included in Appendix A.
The standard deviations and average absolute variations both indicate that law schools generally did not experience significant
changes to their academic reputation scores between 1998 and 2013.
The average standard deviation for all the law schools in the data set
during the studied period was a very modest .074.16 The average absolute variation for the schools was only .061.17 In fact, the average
range of movement for the academic reputation scores of the law
schools in the data set throughout the sixteen-year period was only
14. See infra Part III.
15. This conclusion is consistent with the findings of another extensive empirical
study of the scores, which was conducted in 1998. See Schmalbeck, supra note 1, at 586
(“The predominant impression formed in working with the data on the several U.S. News
studies was noted at the outset: that law school reputations are extremely durable.”).
16. See Appendix A, supra note 11.
17. Id. With respect to both the standard deviations and the absolute variations, the
data does not reveal any significant discrepancies between the law schools based on their
reputation levels. Categorizing the schools by their 1998 academic reputation scores, the
data reveals that the schools that began the period with academic reputation scores above
4.0 possessed an average standard deviation of .072. See id. Those schools that began with
scores between 3.0 and 3.9 possessed an average standard deviation of .077. Id. Those
schools that began the period between 2.5 and 2.9 possessed an average standard deviation
of .079. Id. The schools that began with scores between 2.0 and 2.4 possessed an average
standard deviation of .074. Id. Finally, those schools that began the period with scores
between 1.3 and 1.9 possessed an average standard deviation of .067. Id.
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.248.18 On average, in other words, each law school in the data set
moved a total of .248 (both up and down) during the period between
1998 and 2013.
Chart A illustrates the general lack of volatility for the academic
reputation scores.
Chart A

Chart A reveals that approximately one half of the law schools in
the data set finished 2013 with academic reputation scores that were
within .1 of the scores with which they began sixteen years earlier.
Fifty-three law schools (31%) finished the sixteen-year period with
scores that were only .2 removed from their original academic reputation scores. Only thirty-five out of the 172 law schools in the data
set (20%) finished the sixteen-year period with scores that were more
than .2 removed from their original 1998 academic reputation scores.
The fact that academic reputation scores tended to be stable during the period may not come as a surprise to those who tend to follow
the scores of their own schools. What may be more surprising (and
distressing) is the fact that most of the movement that did occur to
the scores during the period was in a downward direction.19 Equally
surprising is the fact that, at least for most of the studied period, the
18. Id.
19. See infra Part II.B.
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movement of a law school’s academic reputation score tended to be
inversely correlated to the strength of that school’s U.S. News rank
and academic reputation score.20 Both of these trends will be discussed in more detail in the following subsections.
B. Downward Trend in Academic Reputation Scores
Despite the various efforts and resources law schools have devoted
over the years to improving their academic reputation scores, the majority of schools experienced declines to their academic reputation
scores between 1998 and 2013. Of the 172 law schools that received
academic reputation scores for every year between 1998 and 2013,
over 63% finished in 2013 with academic reputation scores that were
lower than the scores with which they started in 1998.21 Thirty-one
law schools (18%) succeeded in finishing the sixteen-year period with
the same academic reputation scores they possessed in 1998.22 A
mere thirty-three law schools in the data set (19%) were able to finish
the sixteen-year period with academic reputation scores that were
even .1 higher than the scores with which they began in 1998.23 More
than three times as many law schools suffered a decline during the
period, therefore, than were able to improve their scores.24 These results are demonstrated below in Chart B.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See infra Part II.E.
See Appendix A, supra note 11.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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Chart B

The data is particularly disheartening for law schools when one
considers the number of schools that were able to improve their
scores by more than a .1 margin. Presumably, law schools that have
devoted large amounts of resources to improving their academic reputation scores were hoping for more than an increase of .1 over sixteen years. The reality, however, is that only eighteen institutions in
the data set (10%) have been able to improve their academic reputation scores by more than .1 since 1998.25 Only eight law schools (5%
of the total) were able to raise their scores by more than .2 between
1998 and 2013.26 A summary of all the academic reputation score
changes for the period is provided in Table 1 below.

25. See Appendix B, supra note 13.
26. See id. A list of those eight schools is provided in Part IV. See infra Table 11.
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Table 1

Academic Reputation Score Changes
1998 – 2013
Number of Schools that Finished
Period .3 or more Higher

8

Number of Schools that Finished
Period .2 Higher

10

Number of Schools that Finished
Period .1 Higher

15

Number of Schools that Finished
Period Level

31

Number of Schools that Finished
Period .1 Lower

38

Number of Schools that Finished
Period .2 Lower

43

Number of Schools that Finished
Period .3 or more Lower

27

Total

172

33

108

In contrast to the difficulty law schools encountered in improving
their scores, Table 1 reveals that large numbers of law schools suffered significant declines. Seventy law schools, over 40% of the total
in the data set, finished the period with a decline of .2 or more.27
Twenty-seven law schools, over 15% of all schools in the data set, finished the period with a decline of .3 or more.28 Chart C below depicts
the results of Table 1 in a pie chart.

10.

27. See id.
28. See id. A list of those twenty-seven schools is provided in Part IV. See infra Table
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Chart C

A graph of the aggregate movement for the academic reputation
scores of all of the law schools in the data set is provided below as
Chart D. As Chart D illustrates, the average academic reputation
score for the law schools in the data set when the period began in
1998 was 2.630. By 2013, the average academic reputation score had
declined to 2.541. In the aggregate, law schools lost 15.2 academic
reputation points during the period.29 The average change for the 172
law schools in the data set, therefore, was a decline of .088.30 The
median academic reputation score for all law schools in the data set
was 2.5 when the period began in 1998.31 The median reached its nadir of 2.3 in 2006 and finished at 2.4 in 2013.32
Chart D reveals that there was one particularly notable exception
to the general trend downward for academic reputation scores between 1998 and 2012. For reasons that are difficult to explain, the
academic reputation scores of law schools sharply increased in 2008.
In that one year alone, the average for the 172 law schools in the data set improved from 2.543 to 2.604, representing an aggregate in-

29.
30.
31.
32.

See Appendix A, supra note 11.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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crease of 10.5 points.33 An unprecedented ninety-seven law schools
(56% of the total) saw their academic reputation scores improve in
2008.34 By contrast, the average number of schools that improved
each year during the overall period was only 32.53.35 In fact, eighteen
law schools saw their academic reputation scores jump .2 in 2008.36
Chart D

In light of the fact that the same number of law schools were able
to gain .2 or more for the entire 16 year period, the 2008 data seems
truly atypical.37 A mere six schools, furthermore, experienced a decline in their academic reputation scores between 2007 and 2008.38
The average number of schools that declined each year during the
studied period was 42.07, more than seven times the number that
declined in 2008.39 Even in 2012, the year that included the next
largest aggregate increase during the period, the figures were quite
dissimilar to 2008. In 2012, the aggregate increase was only 2.9

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See id. (subtract column G:175 from H:175 in Appendix A to arrive at 10.5).
See infra Chart F.
See id.
See Appendix A, supra note 11.
See id.
See infra Chart E.
See id.
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points.40 A little more than half as many schools went up in 2012 as
did in 2008 and only two schools increased by .2 or more in 2012.41
It is very difficult to explain why the voting patterns of academics
changed so dramatically in 2008. U.S. News confirms that there were
no methodological changes for that year’s survey.42 U.S. News polled
the same four faculty positions, used the same labels to describe the
scoring system, and used the same rounding methodology to compute
the averages.43 What is certain is that the downward trend in academic reputation scores for the sixteen-year period would have been
even more pronounced had it not been for the enigmatic data from 2008.
C. The Academic Reputation Score Results for 2013
The results of 2013 were consistent with the general downward
trend in academic reputation scores that prevailed during the period.
In fact, as Chart D illustrates above, the results of 2013 constituted
the largest annual decline in academic reputation scores during the
studied period. In this one year, the academic reputation scores of
law schools fell by 9.3 points in the aggregate.44 That decline
amounted to an average change of -.054 for each school. In no other
year during the sixteen-year period was the decline so severe. The
next largest decline for the studied period occurred in 2002. In that
year, law schools declined by an aggregate of 5.2 points, representing
an average change of -.030 per school.45 The aggregate decline for law
schools in 2013, therefore, was nearly twice that of the next largest
decline during the period.
Chart E, below, represents the number of law schools that declined each during the studied period.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See Appendix A, supra note 11.
See id.
Author’s Telephone Interview with Samuel Flanigan, supra note 6.
Id.
See Appendix A, supra note 11.
See id.
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Chart E

Chart E reveals that ninety law schools, 52% of the total number
of law schools in the data set, experienced declines to their academic
reputation scores in 2013. Never before in the studied period had so
many law schools experienced a decline to their scores in one year. In
fact, the number of law schools that declined in 2013 was more than
twice the average (42.07) for the number of schools experiencing declines each year during the period.
Chart F, by contrast, represents the number of law schools that
improved each year during the period.
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Chart F

Chart F reveals that only ten law schools succeeded in improving
their academic reputation scores in 2013. Only 6% of the law schools
in the data set, in other words, were able to improve their academic
reputation scores by even .1 in the year 2013. No other year during
the period saw so few schools improve (although a mere 11 schools
managed to improve in 2011). In fact, the number of schools that improved in 2013 was less than one-third the average number of schools
that improved each year during the period (32.53).46
Another notably grim aspect of the 2013 figures for law schools
was the number of institutions that experienced significant declines.
Ten law schools lost .2 from their academic reputation scores in 2013
(George Washington University, Howard University, John Marshall
Law School, Nova Southeastern University, New York Law School,
New York University, University of Arizona, University of Missouri,
University of Richmond (Williams), and William Mitchell College of
Law).47 One law school, St. Louis University, lost .4 from its academic
reputation score in 2013.48 Prior to 2013, no more than three law
46. The average number of schools in the data set retaining their same academic reputation score each year during the studied period was 97.40. See id. The fact that 57% of
the law schools retained their same score each year (on average) is another indication of
the general lack of volatility for the scores.
47. See id.
48. See id.
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schools had ever suffered a decline of .2 or more to their academic
reputation scores in the same year (three law schools suffered such
margins in 2002, 2005, 2006, and 2012).49
As with 2008, therefore, the results of 2013 were exceptional in a
number of respects. Unlike the 2008 data, however, the sharp decline
in academic reputation scores in 2013 was consonant with the overarching downward trend that characterized the period as a whole.
Why the overall trend was so accelerated in 2013 is an interesting
question. Was the 2013 data simply an aberration (a natural correction, perhaps, for the results in 2012 where the academic reputation
scores had actually gone up)? Or is the 2013 data a harbinger of
things to come for the next several years? To address this question,
we must consider why the academic reputation scores have been
trending downward since 1998.
There is little reason to think that the academic enterprise itself
has suffered at law schools since 1998. To the contrary, law schools
have been acquiring more and more academics, have increasingly
focused on academic credentials in the hiring process, and have devoted more and more resources to facilitating scholarship and the
exchange of ideas between individuals and institutions.50 The decline
in academic reputation scores for the majority of schools over the
past sixteen years probably cannot be attributed, therefore, to an actual decline in the academic qualifications or performances of the 108
law schools that finished the period lower than when they began. Instead, it seems more likely that the declines to the scores are a reflection of the way academics have been evaluating and grading each
other in the U.S. News ranking process. More than anything, the
downward trend in academic reputation scores reveals that the grading scale itself has “tightened” over the last sixteen years as the academics completing the U.S. News surveys have gradually employed
more and more stringent standards to evaluate their fellow institutions.
What could account for this change in the way academics are
evaluating each other in the U.S. News surveys? The most likely explanation for the downward trend stems from the zero-sum nature of
the U.S. News rankings themselves and the increasing importance of
those rankings with respect to student and faculty recruiting, alumni
relations, and fundraising.51 The academics who complete the surveys
each year undoubtedly understand that the success of their institution in the rankings (as well as the success of their alma mater in the
rankings) must ultimately come at the expense of its competitors.
49. See id.
50. See, e.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 3, at 54-61 (summarizing some ways in which the
orientations of many law schools have become more rigorously academic).
51. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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This fact gives all academics a powerful incentive to employ increasingly stringent standards in their evaluations of competing institutions, particularly with respect to those institutions that pose the
greatest obstacle to their own school’s advancement.52 The acceleration of the downward trend in scores in 2013, therefore, could be a
reflection of the increased competition law schools face as a result of
the recent drops in applications and the importance applicants seem
to be placing on the rankings in their matriculation decisions.53 If
true, we may see several more years of precipitous declines like those
experienced in 2013 while law schools attempt to weather their
current difficulties.
D. Comparison of Academic Reputation Scores to Reputation Scores
Formulated by Lawyers and Judges
In sharp contrast to the academic reputation scores, the U.S.
News reputation scores derived from lawyers and judges have substantially improved over the course of the last sixteen years. This fact
provides additional support for the proposition that academic reputation scores were influenced by strategic considerations during the
studied period.
A table of the 1998 and 2013 reputation scores from lawyers and
judges is included as Appendix C.54 The data reveals that 142 of the
172 law schools in the data set finished with lawyer/judge reputation
scores that were higher in 2013 than the scores with which they began in 1998.55 In contrast to the paltry 19% of the schools that were
able to improve their reputation scores among their fellow academics,
the period saw 83% of the law schools succeed in improving their
reputation scores among lawyers and judges.
These improvements in the lawyer/judge reputation scores, furthermore, were often substantial. Eighty-three law schools (48% of
the data set) were able to improve their lawyer/judge reputation
scores by .3 or more during the period.56 Recall that only eight law
schools were able to improve their academic reputation scores by .3
52. The fact that this incentive exists, of course, has already been recognized by other
commentators. See, e.g., Seto, supra note 1, at 516 (recognizing danger that reputation
scores could be subject to “gaming” by respondents). This study now provides empirical
evidence that the incentive is in fact affecting (consciously or unconsciously) the voting
patterns of the survey respondents.
53. Ethan Bronner, Law Schools’ Applications Fall as Costs Rise and Jobs Are Cut,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/education/law-schoolsapplications-fall-as-costs-rise-and-jobs-are-cut.html?_r=0 (reporting dramatic decline in
law school applications since 2010).
54. See Appendix C, available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/lawreview/ (select
Issues, Past Issues, Vol. 40, Summer 2013).
55. See id.
56. See id.
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or more during the studied period. Equally significant is the fact that
only thirteen law schools (8%) suffered a decline to their lawyer/judge
reputation scores during the period, in contrast to the 108 law
schools (63%) that suffered declines to their academic reputation
scores.57 Overall, the average change for all law schools during the
period with respect to their lawyer/judge reputation scores was a
gain of .256.58 The average change for all law schools during the period with respect to their academic reputation scores, by contrast, was
-.088. To help illustrate the disparities between the academic and
lawyer/judge reputation scores, Charts B and C are repeated alongside the analogous data for the lawyer/judge reputation scores, as
represented in Charts G and H.

57. See id.
58. See id.
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Between the two types of scores, the lawyer/judge reputation
scores would seem to be more rationally connected (in the aggregate)
to the developments of the last sixteen years. Law school tuition increased substantially over the last two decades to allow law schools
to upgrade their facilities, hire additional academics, share the results of their research and scholarship, and promote their brands.59 It
stands to reason that some of these endeavors would have had a positive impact on the ways in which law schools are perceived as academic institutions. The improvements in the lawyer/judge reputation
scores, therefore, seem more congruent with recent developments
than the substantial declines law schools suffered to their academic
reputation scores.
The downward trend in academic reputation scores is highly problematic, therefore, because it appears to have been caused (at least in
large part) by the influence of the U.S. News rankings themselves.
The influence of strategic considerations on the voting process constitutes a significant methodological problem for the rankings because
such influences are fundamentally inapposite to the function of the
scores as measures of performance. To the extent that strategic considerations influence the scores, the scores cease to be rational reflections of meaningful criteria.
The fact that strategic considerations might be affecting all
schools to some degree does not mitigate the problem. Once the scores
cease to be reflections of meaningful criteria, there simply is no reason to think that strategic considerations will affect all schools to the
same degree. In fact, there is every reason to think that strategic considerations will affect law schools in very unequal ways. Every law
school occupies its own place in the U.S. News hierarchy. As a result,
the influence of strategic considerations is likely to impact disproportionately those schools that are perceived as the greatest obstacles to
the advancement of other schools. This fact most likely accounts for
the results discussed in the next subsection.
E. Correlation Between Downward Trend in Academic
Reputation Scores and Strength of U.S. News Ranks and
Academic Reputation Scores
The downward trend for academic reputation scores between 1998
and 2013 was most pronounced for those law schools that enjoyed the
highest ranks and academic reputation scores at the start of the period. Table 2 charts the changes in academic reputation scores for the
law schools that possessed the twenty-five highest academic reputation scores when the period began in 1998. Twenty-seven institutions
59. TAMANAHA, supra note 3, at 126-34 (describing tuition increases and their causes).
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are included in this definition since there was a tie for the twentyfifth highest score.
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Table 2

Academic Reputation Score Changes for the Twenty-Seven Law
Schools With the Top Academic Reputation Scores in 1998

Institution
Harvard University
Yale University
Columbia University
Stanford University
University of Chicago
University of Michigan –
Ann Arbor
New York University
University of California –
Berkeley
University of Pennsylvania
University of Virginia
Cornell University
Duke University
Northwestern University
Georgetown University
University of Texas – Austin
University of California –
Los Angeles
Vanderbilt University
University of Minnesota –
Twin Cities
University of Southern
California (Gould)
University of Wisconsin –
Madison
University of North Carolina
– Chapel Hill
University of Illinois –
Urbana-Champaign
University of Iowa
Boston University
Emory University
George Washington
University
University of California
(Hastings)

Change in
Reputation
Score for
Period
-0.1

1998
Reputation
Score

2013
Reputation
Score

4.9

4.8

4.9

4.8

-0.1

4.8

4.6

-0.2

4.8

4.8

0.0

4.8

4.6

-0.2

4.7

4.4

-0.3

4.6

4.4

-0.2

4.6

4.4

-0.2

4.5

4.3

-0.2

4.5

4.4

-0.1

4.4

4.2

-0.2

4.3

4.2

-0.1

4.3

4.1

-0.2

4.2

4.1

-0.1

4.2

4.1

-0.1

4.1

3.9

-0.2

3.9

3.8

-0.1

3.8

3.5

-0.3

3.8

3.6

-0.2

3.8

3.4

-0.4

3.7

3.5

-0.2

3.6

3.1

-0.5

3.6

3.3

-0.3

3.5

3.4

-0.1

3.5

3.5

0.0

3.5

3.4

-0.1

3.5

3.2

-0.3
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As Table 2 reveals, not a single one of these top schools was able
to improve its academic reputation score during the studied period.
In fact, only two of these twenty-seven law schools were even able to
maintain their academic reputation scores at the level at which they
began in 1998. As a result, twenty-five of the top twenty-seven law
schools (93%) saw their academic reputation scores suffer a decline
during the period.60 Many of these declines, furthermore, were significant. The average result for these top law schools was a decline of
.185, more than twice the decline suffered by law schools generally
during the period.61
A broader analysis of the data confirms that the movement in academic reputation scores for the period tended to be inversely correlated to the strength of the law schools’ academic reputation scores
when the period began; that is, the higher a law school’s academic
reputation score in 1998, the more likely its academic reputation score suffered a decline during the period. Chart I illustrates
the phenomenon.
Chart I

60. Again, this categorization of the schools is based solely on their 1998 academic
reputation scores. A similar analyses based on U.S. News ranks can be found infra notes
66-69 and accompanying text.
61. The average decline for all 172 schools in the data set was .088. See supra notes
29-30 and accompanying text.
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For Chart I, the 172 law schools in the data set are broken down
into five groups based on their 1998 academic reputation scores.
Chart I reveals that the group that began the period with the highest
academic reputation scores (those between 4.0 and 4.9) suffered the
largest average decline during the period while the group with the
second-highest category of academic reputation scores (those between
3.0 and 3.9) suffered the second-worst average decline. The groups
that started the period in the third and fourth highest categories of
academic reputation scores finished the period with the third- and
fourth-worst average declines, respectively. Finally, the group of
schools that started the period in the lowest category of academic
reputation scores finished the period with the best result, that is, the
smallest average decline.
With respect to the law schools whose academic reputation scores
moved the most during the period, the data similarly reveals that the
higher-ranked schools tended to fare worse than their lower-ranked
counterparts. As previously mentioned, there were seventy law
schools that suffered declines of .2 or more during the sixteen-year
period.62 The average 1998 academic reputation score for those seventy schools was a relatively high 2.819.63 In contrast, the average 1998
academic reputation score for the eighteen law schools that managed
to raise their academic reputation scores by .2 or more during the
period was only 2.300.64 Recall that the overall average academic
reputation score in 1998 was 2.630.65
Chart J below utilizes the 1998 U.S. News ranks to categorize the
eighteen schools that improved by .2 or more. Chart K represents the
same data for the seventy schools whose academic reputation scores
declined by .2 or more during the period.

62. See supra Table 2.
63. See Appendix A, supra note 11.
64. See id.
65. See supra Chart D. Note that the average academic reputation score for second
tier schools in 1998 (i.e., those ranked between fifty-two and ninety) was 2.605 and the
average academic reputation score for schools ranked in the third tier in 1998 (i.e., those
ranked between ninety-one and 136) was 2.180. See Appendix A, supra note 11.
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The differences between Charts J and K are notable. As Chart J
reveals, a very small percentage of the law schools that improved
their academic reputation scores by .2 or more came from the top fifty
in the U.S. News rankings. Only one law school in the top twenty-five
of the 1998 U.S. News rankings was able to improve its academic
reputation score by more than .1 during the period (Fordham, at
number twenty-five in the 1998 rankings) and only two law schools
with 1998 U.S. News ranks between thirty and fifty-one were able to
improve their scores by more than .1 (Washington University, with a
1998 rank of thirty, and the University of Hawaii, with a 1998 rank
of fifty).66
In contrast to their negligible presence among the schools that
significantly gained in academic reputation, Chart K demonstrates
that law schools ranked in the top fifty of the 1998 U.S. News rankings were well represented in the list of schools that significantly declined during the period. In contrast to the lone top twenty-five
school in the list of schools that improved by .2 or more, there were
fifteen law schools ranked in the top twenty-five of the 1998 U.S.
News rankings that lost at least .2 from their academic reputation
scores during the period (constituting 21% of the total for schools that
declined by that margin).67 Similarly, there were eight law schools
ranked between thirty and fifty-one in the 1998 U.S. News rankings
that declined by at least .2, in contrast to the two schools in this category that were able to improve by that margin.68
Another prominent difference between the two charts relates to
the fourth tier schools. Whereas fourth tier schools constituted a
healthy 22% of the law schools that gained by .2 or more, they constituted a mere 9% of the schools that significantly declined during the
period. In a variety of ways, therefore, the data demonstrates that
the movement in academic reputation scores tended to be inversely
correlated to the strength of the law schools’ academic reputation
scores and U.S. News ranks at the beginning of the period, with the
higher-ranked schools experiencing the greatest difficulties in maintaining or improving their scores and the lower-ranked schools experiencing the greatest successes.

66. See Appendix A, supra note 11. Note that there were five law schools tied for the
twenty-fifth spot in the 1998 U.S. News rankings, which accounts for the gap in the pie
chart between the category of schools ranked one to twenty-five and the category for
schools ranked thirty to fifty.
67. Id. Note that this list is slightly different from the one in Table 3 because that list
was based on the top twenty-five academic reputation scores rather than the overall U.S.
News ranks. Also note that there were twenty-nine schools in the top twenty-five for the
U.S. News rankings in 1998 by virtue of a five way tie for the twenty-fifth spot.
68. See id.
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In an effort to understand the relationship between U.S. News
ranks and academic reputation scores further, the author calculated
the annual movement of the law schools’ academic reputation scores
based on the U.S. News ranks possessed by those law schools in the
year preceding the movement. To accomplish this, the author categorized all the law schools in the data set into five groups based on
their U.S. News ranks for each year.69 With respect to every year in
the period, the author then computed the average change for the law
schools in each category based on the U.S. News ranks that the
schools possessed in the prior year. Chart L summarizes the results
of this inquiry for the first twelve years of the studied period, that is,
between 1998 and 2009.
Chart L

69. For 2012 and 2013, the five categories encompassed schools ranked one to twentyfive, twenty-six to fifty, fifty-one to 100, 101 to 145, and in the fourth tier. The categorization
was complicated by the fact that U.S. News altered its own ranking categories twice during
the studied period. From 1998 until 2002, U.S. News utilized a “second tier” to demarcate
schools ranked approximately between fifty-one and ninety and a “third tier” to demarcate
schools ranked approximately between ninety-one and 135. U.S. News abandoned the “second tier” category in 2003 and abandoned the “third tier” category in 2011. See Bondareff,
supra note 1, at 2 (summarizing U.S. News methodologies between 1998 and 2010); Best
Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (2011), http://web.archive.org/web/
20110504010814/http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduateschools/top-law-schools/law-rankings (reflecting methodological change that began in
2011). For the years between 1998 and 2003, therefore, the author utilized five categories
that encompassed schools ranked one to twenty-five, twenty-six to fifty, in the second tier,
in the third tier, and in the fourth tier. For the years between 2004 and 2011, the categories encompassed schools ranked one to twenty-five, twenty-six to fifty, fifty-one to 100, in
the third tier, and in the fourth tier.
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With respect to the majority of the studied period, Chart L reveals
a generally inverse correlation between a law school’s U.S. News
rank and the movement in that school’s academic reputation score
during the subsequent year. Chart L reveals that law schools ranked
in the top twenty-five in the U.S. News rankings were far more likely
to suffer declines to their academic reputation scores between 1998
and 2009 than law schools that were ranked below them. If a school
was ranked in the top twenty-five during this period, it could expect
that its academic reputation score would decrease by an average of
.0136 in the immediately following year. Stated another way, the top
twenty-five schools were declining at a rate of .136 every ten years
during the first twelve years of the studied period. This rate of decline was ten times worse than the rate of decline experienced by
schools ranked between twenty-five and fifty, seven times worse than
the law schools ranked between fifty-one and 100, and forty-five
times worse than the schools ranked in the third tier (approximately
101 to 145) during the year preceding the decline.
In sharp contrast to all the schools ranked above them, law
schools ranked in the fourth tier typically experienced an improvement to their academic reputation scores between 1998 and 2009. For
each year during this period, the average change for law schools that
had been ranked in the fourth tier during the preceding year was an
increase of .0033.
Arguably, the lower-ranked schools had more success raising or
maintaining their academic reputation scores over this period because, quite simply, they had more opportunities to improve.70 By the
same token, however, one would think that the lower-ranked schools
would have faced the greatest difficulties in gaining the attention of
other academics and in overcoming the negative connotations associated with a lower U.S. News ranking. A dean of a lower-ranked
school, for example, once described its school’s status in the third tier
as “a self-fulfilling nightmare.”71
Interestingly, third and fourth tier law schools have not been as
successful in maintaining their academic reputation scores over the
last few years. Since 2010, the data for the year-to-year changes in
law school rankings have not reflected the inverse correlation between U.S. News ranks and academic reputation score movements
that pervaded the first twelve years of the studied period. As with
Chart L, Chart M below demonstrates the average year-to-year
changes for law schools based on their U.S. News rankings during
70. The addition of a few highly regarded lateral or entry level faculty, for example,
might have a relatively stronger impact to the academic reputation of a lower-ranked
school than it would at a school with an existing base of well-established scholars.
71. Sauder & Espeland, supra note 2, at 13.
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the prior year. Unlike Chart L, however, Chart M is limited to the
last four years.
Chart M

Chart M demonstrates that the last four years have not been
characterized by the same pattern that prevailed during the first
twelve years of the studied period. In fact, the lowest-ranked schools
have suffered the greatest declines during the last four years while
the higher-ranked schools have suffered the smallest declines.
It is not yet clear whether the data from the last four years represents a shift in the grading patterns of voting academics or whether
the last few years simply constitute a statistical anomaly. In certain
respects, the pattern exhibited in Chart M would seem more logical
than the pattern that prevailed over the first twelve years. As stated
previously, one would think that the lowest-ranked schools would
experience the most difficulties in positively influencing their reputations. The higher-ranked schools would appear to be in a far better
position to generate positive impressions about their reputations, to
fund scholarship by their faculty, and to lure away attractive lateral
candidates from the schools ranked below them (practices that would,
presumably, positively impact a school’s academic reputation). In
other contexts related to the U.S. News rankings, such as improving
the median LSAT figures for their incoming classes, the higherranked schools have in fact been able to leverage their positions
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atop the rankings to further distance themselves from the lowerranked schools.72
So why were the last four years the exception rather than the
norm during the period as a whole? Why was the studied period as a
whole characterized by a strong inverse correlation between U.S.
News ranks and academic reputations on the one hand and movements to academic reputation scores on the other? As stated previously, not a single one of the law schools that began the period with a
top twenty-five academic reputation score was able to improve that
score by the end of the period. In fact, twenty-five of the twenty-seven
law schools with the highest academic reputation scores in 1998 ended up suffering a decline to their academic reputation scores over the
course of the period.73 As a group, those top schools suffered a decline
of more than twice the overall average. In terms of U.S. News ranks,
fifteen law schools ranked in the top twenty-five of the 1998 U.S.
News rankings ended up losing .2 or more from their academic reputation scores during the studied period. Eight law schools ranked between thirty and fifty-one in the 1998 U.S. News rankings declined
by at least .2 during the period.74 In contrast, only one law school
from the top twenty-five of the 1998 U.S. News rankings was able to
improve its academic reputation score by more than .1 during the
period and only two law schools ranked between thirty and fifty-one
in 1998 were able to improve their scores by more than .1 by the end
of the period.75
Conversely, fourth tier law schools enjoyed far more success during the period as a whole than their higher-ranked competitors. Law
schools that began the period in the fourth tier constituted 22% of all
the law schools that gained .2 or more to their academic reputation
scores during the period whereas those schools constituted only 9% of
the law schools that lost .2 or more during the period. For the first
twelve years of the period, furthermore, fourth tier schools were the
only group that actually succeeded in improving their academic reputation scores, on average, from year to year.
It is very difficult to explain the inverse correlation that prevailed
for the majority of the period, therefore, without reference to the
strategic considerations that likely caused the downward trend in
academic reputation scores generally. The inverse correlation between a law school’s reputation and rank on the one hand, and the
72. See Henderson & Morriss, supra note 3, at 187 (demonstrating through empirical
analysis that highly ranked law schools had the most success in improving the LSAT
scores of their matriculates).
73. See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text.
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movement of that school’s academic reputation score on the other, is
likely attributable to the fact that the higher-ranked schools presented the greatest obstacle to the advancement of the other law schools
in the rankings. Many academics could afford to employ a more generous grading standard for the lowest-ranked schools, by contrast,
because those schools did not pose a similar threat with respect to
the rankings. The higher a law school was ranked, the greater the
number of competing schools that looked up at it in the U.S. News
hierarchy. In light of the fact that the top law schools dominate the
ranks of academia, furthermore, faculty at all levels may well have
been influenced by their desire to enhance their alma maters’ positions vis-à-vis the other top schools.76
Does the data from the last four years suggest that strategic considerations are now playing a less pervasive a role in the voting?
There are several reasons to doubt such a hypothesis. First, it is difficult to point to any developments in the last four years that would
have diminished the influence of strategic considerations. Competition among law schools with respect to the U.S. News rankings appears to be just as intense today as it was between 1998 and 2009.
The voting population of academics filling out the surveys, furthermore, does not seem to have changed appreciably since 2010.
It is important to remember that the downward trend in academic
reputation scores has accelerated since 2010. This fact suggests that
the influence of strategic considerations may be increasing at the
current time. The 2013 rankings constituted the single largest decline in academic reputation scores for the entire period. When combined with the substantial drop that occurred in 2011, the period between 2010 and 2013 represented the worst four-year period for law
schools during the entire studied period.77 In all likelihood, therefore,
the last four years represent a temporary anomaly in the data or,
at most, a shift in the way strategic considerations are influencing
the voting.
To be clear, this Article is not asserting that anyone has voted in
bad faith in the context of the U.S. News rankings. The fact that
strategic considerations have influenced the voting process does not
76. Statistics regarding entry level hiring at law schools have been tabulated for the
last three years by Sarah Lawsky and Dan Markel at Prawfsblawg. See Sarah Lawsky,
Entry Level Hiring: The 2013 Report – Call for Information, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 27, 2013,
3:24 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com. Prior to 2011, Lawrence Solum tabulated similar
statistics at the Legal Theory Blog. See, e.g., Lawrence Solum, 2009 Entry Level Hiring
Report, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Apr. 26, 2009, 7:59 PM), http://lsolum.typepad.com.
77. See supra Chart D. Between 2010 and 2013, the average law school academic reputation score declined by .066 (from 2.607 to 2.541). Id. The second worst four-year period
for law schools occurred between 2001 and 2004, when the average law school academic
reputation score declined by .043 (from 2.618 to 2.575). Id.
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necessarily imply that any of the voting has been disingenuous. The
data demonstrates, however, that the voting academics are employing increasingly stringent standards in their evaluations and, perhaps most importantly, the data strongly suggests that the voting
academics are particularly stringent in their grading with respect to
those schools that pose the greatest obstacles to the advancement of
the institutions with which they are associated.
The essential point is that the success of the U.S. News rankings
has itself changed the way the rankings are being computed. That in
turn raises important normative questions about whether the current
method of faculty polling is the most appropriate or objective way to
conduct the surveys. Some commentators have analogized the function of the U.S. News rankings to Consumer Reports, in that the
rankings are intended to help prospective law students make informed decisions about where to purchase their legal educations.78
But Consumer Reports would never dream of publishing a review of a
manufacturer’s product that was based primarily on evaluations from
that manufacturer’s competitors. For obvious reasons, the definitive
assessment of Ford’s new automobile is not entrusted to GM and
Toyota. Why is that method being employed so pervasively for law
schools? The extensive influence of the U.S. News rankings now requires voting academics to disassociate themselves from powerful
considerations of self-interest. The time may have come for the academic reputation scores to be eliminated from the U.S. News methodology. At the very least, the U.S. News methodology should be altered in order to mitigate the ways in which these strategic considerations are compromising the results.79
F. Disparity Between Public and Private Law Schools
An empirical analysis of the data reveals that private law schools
had slightly more success than their public counterparts in maintain78. A particular reference along these lines, for example, comes from an interview
with a law school dean conducted by Michael Sauder and Wendy Espeland: “Our job and
our career goals haven’t changed, but now we have metrics. I think it’s just like Consumer
Reports for cars. You can quarrel with individual things, you can quibble with the formula,
but we have a wonderful product and it’s good for people to know.” Sauder & Espeland,
supra note 3, at 212.
79. At least one commentator has already suggested a change in the U.S. News methodology to help address the influence of these strategic considerations. See Seto, supra note
1, at 555 (arguing that U.S. News should discard the highest and lowest 10% of the academic survey responses because “[d]iscarding the high and low extremes would reduce the
effect of strategic responses, presumably therefore reducing the amount of such gaming,
and increasing the validity of the resulting scores”). Brian Leiter has also recommended
changes in the way the surveys are conducted, principally to address the echo effect. See
infra note 89. This author proposes additional improvements to the U.S. News methodology
infra in Part V.
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ing their academic reputation scores during the sixteen-year period.
On average, the seventy-five public schools in the data set averaged a
decline of .100 during the sixteen-year period. The ninety-seven private schools, by contrast, averaged a decline of only .079. The data
related to academic reputation score changes for public and private
law schools is summarized below in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.80 To
facilitate the comparison between the two types of schools, Charts N
and O were created to represent the same data in pie chart form.

80. In order to categorize the law schools as public or private, the author relied exclusively on the capsule summaries of the law schools provided at the end of the U.S. News
rankings.

2013]

755

LAW SCHOOL ACADEMIC REPUTATION

Table 3
Reputation Score Changes
For Public Schools, 1998 – 2013
Public Schools that Finished
Period .3 or more Higher

4

Public Schools that Finished
Period .2 Higher

3

Public Schools that Finished
Period .1 Higher

6

Public Schools that Finished
Period Level

13

Public Schools that Finished
Period .1 Lower

16

Public Schools that Finished
Period .2 Lower

19

Public Schools that Finished
Period .3 or more Lower

14

Total

75

Average Change

-.100

13

49
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Table 4
Reputation Score Changes
For Private Schools, 1998 – 2013
Private Schools that Finished
Period .3 or more Higher

4

Private Schools that Finished
Period .2 Higher

7

Private Schools that Finished
Period .1 Higher

9

Private Schools that Finished
Period Level

18

Private Schools that Finished
Period .1 Lower

22

Private Schools that Finished
Period .2 Lower

24

Private Schools that Finished
Period .3 or more Lower

13

Total

97

Average Change

-.079

20

59
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Chart O

Chart O
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As Charts N and O illustrate, a higher percentage of public law
schools suffered a decline to their academic reputation scores during
the period whereas a higher percentage of private law schools saw
their academic reputation scores improve. It should be noted, however, that the disparity between public and private schools actually
narrowed in 2013. As a group, the seventy-five public law schools in
the data set averaged a decline of .040 in the year 2013.81 The ninetyseven private schools, by contrast, averaged the more significant
decline of .065.82
One potential explanation for the disparity between public and
private law schools is the possibility that public law schools have not
expended (on average) the same amount of resources on activities
that could positively influence their academic reputation scores.83
This explanation, however, is predicated on the assumption that law
schools are capable of positively influencing their academic reputation scores through the strategic use of expenditures.84 Another possibility is that private schools were able to utilize financial resources
to positively impact their U.S. News ranks.85 In light of the echo effect discussed in the next Part, such improvements could have positively influenced the private schools’ academic reputation scores.
One purpose of this longitudinal study is to foster additional analysis about how law schools might be able to positively impact their
own academic reputation scores. To that end, this Article will conclude by identifying the law schools that experienced the greatest
changes to their academic reputation scores during the period and to
81. See Appendix A, supra note 11.
82. See id.
83. Some have argued that the rankings are primarily a function of a school’s finances. The former dean of a successful public law school (University of Houston), for example,
recently argued that her school’s struggles to improve in the rankings were primarily attributable to the financial disparities between her school and its competitors (many of
whom were private). See Rapoport, supra note 8, at 361 n.6 (2006) (“Most of what they
have that we don’t is money, and lots of it. Many of them have private foundations with
large endowments. That additional money enables them to pay larger salaries to professors, to buy more students with scholarship funds, to have larger library collections, to hold
more conferences, etc.”). Not all public schools, of course, operate at a comparative financial
disadvantage. It is quite possible, however, that the median expenditures for public schools
over the last two decades have been less than that of private schools. See id.
84. The pervasive view appears to be that such expenditures can be effective in influencing the rankings, at least to some extent. See, e.g., id. (describing an informal study
conducted by Rapoport that examined the correlation between rankings and endowment
size for schools ranked in the top fifty of the U.S. News rankings and finding correlation to
be very high, at .88).
85. There are a variety of ways in which financial resources might be utilized to impact the U.S. News ranks. One of the U.S. News ranking criteria, for example, is expenditures per student. See Morse & Flanigan, supra note 6. In addition, financial resources
could be utilized to lower a faculty/student ratio and provide scholarships to attract incoming classes with higher numeric indicators.
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a brief discussion of some potential causes for those changes. Before
that final discussion, however, it is necessary to analyze in greater
detail one particular factor that may have contributed to the changes
studied in Part IV.
III. THE ECHO EFFECT
A number of scholars have opined that there is an “echo effect”
between a law school’s academic reputation score and its overall U.S.
News rank.86 According to this theory, the U.S. News rankings affect
the academic reputation scores of law schools by influencing (at least
subtly) the ways in which legal academics perceive their fellow institutions.87 The echo effect theory postulates that a law school’s rise in
the U.S. News rankings would in effect “pull” that school’s academic
reputation score higher as legal academics take notice of the school’s
improvement in the rankings and then are influenced to view that
school more favorably.88 Similarly, the echo effect theory postulates
that a decline in the U.S. News rankings would effectively pull a law
school’s academic reputation score down as the decline negatively
influences the way legal academics perceive that institution.89 Note
that, if true, the echo effect would generate a certain inertial force of
its own because academic reputation scores constitute the single
most significant component of the U.S. News methodology (i.e., a rise
86. This putative phenomenon was analyzed and studied by Richard Schmalbeck as
early as 1998. See Schmalbeck, supra note 1, at 576-80. Several years later, Brian Leiter
coined the phrase “echo chamber” to describe it. See Leiter, supra note 2, at 51 (concluding
that “one of the many deficiencies of U.S. News is that its reputational surveys of academics are so poorly conducted that they have simply become echo chambers of the prior year’s
U.S. News ranking”). Jeffrey Stake then modified the term to “echo effect.” See Stake, supra note 2, at 250 & n.28.
87. See, e.g., Stake, supra note 2, at 250 (“Given this concern about the rankings and
the lack of information from other sources, it would not be a shock to find that U.S. News
has influenced how law schools were ranked by the law professors that it surveyed.”).
88. See, e.g., id. at 250 (“One would expect U.S. News to have pulled the reputation of
a school among law teachers toward that school’s previous ranking by U.S. News.”). In fact,
anecdotal evidence has been gathered to support the echo effect’s existence. See Sauder &
Espeland, supra note 2, at 13-14 (summarizing interviews with law school deans that supported notion that U.S. News rankings influence academic reputation scores).
89. Several commentators have argued that the echo effect undermines the validity of
the U.S. News rankings. See, e.g., Jeffrey Evans Stake & Michael Alexeev, Who Responds
to U.S. News & World Report’s Law School Rankings? 4 (Ind. Univ. Maurer Sch. of Law,
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 55, 2009), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=913427 (“Rankings will look more robust than they are if they appear to
take into account lots of independent data while in reality being mostly a sum of echoes.
The lower the ratio of dependent to independent criteria, the more misleading is their appearance.”). Brian Leiter has argued that U.S. News should seek to minimize the echo effect by improving the methodology of the surveys themselves. See Leiter, supra note 7, at
para. 5 (recommending that surveys be conducted online, that questions posed to recipients
be more specific, and that information about each school be provided to the recipients of
the survey).
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in the academic reputation score in itself would help ensure that the
U.S. News rank would continue to go up).90
This sixteen-year longitudinal study provided an opportunity to
evaluate the validity of the echo effect theory in a number of ways.
First, it should be noted that the study’s general findings appear to
be somewhat inconsistent with the underlying premise of the echo
effect theory. As noted above, the movements in academic reputation
scores during the period tended to be inversely correlated to the
strength of the schools’ U.S. News ranks and academic reputation
scores. According to the echo effect, one would think that the law
schools with the highest U.S. News ranks would be able to generate
the most favorable impressions and therefore enjoy the most success
with respect to their academic reputation scores. In fact, an extraordinarily robust interpretation of the echo effect would posit that a
school’s status in a particular tier of the U.S. News rankings would
quickly become a self-fulfilling prophecy as legal academics were influenced to think of (and grade) that school strictly in accordance
with the school’s status in the U.S. News ranking hierarchy. But the
data clearly demonstrates that there is no such overwhelming echo
effect in operation. If legal academics are being influenced by the
U.S. News rankings in terms of how they perceive and vote on their
fellow institutions, the effect must be much more subtle. Indeed, the
primary proponents of the echo effect theory themselves have argued
that the echo effect is modest in nature.91
Scholars that have previously tested for the echo effect have
reached disparate conclusions.92 The most thorough studies have
been conducted by Jeffrey Stake, whose regression analysis led him
to conclude that there is a discernible echo effect between a law
school’s U.S. News rank and its subsequent academic reputation
score.93 Professor Stake’s studies, however, focused on law schools
that were highly ranked and excluded altogether those law schools
90. The inertia would eventually dissipate as the difference between the U.S. News
rank and academic reputation score decreased each year. See, e.g., Stake, supra note 2, at
250-51 (“This echo effect would be expected to diminish over time. . . . Eventually, the system reaches equilibrium and when it does the U.S. News ranks will have no more ability to
pull the reputations.”).
91. See Stake & Alexeev, supra note 89, at 12 (“[T]he quantitative effect of the
USN&WR rankings on the academic scores is not very large. . . . [I]n order to change the
academic score by 0.1 . . . the rank would need to change by 20.”).
92. Richard Schmalbeck, for example, concluded from his analysis that there was
little support for the notion of an echo effect. See Schmalbeck, supra note 1, at 577 (arguing
that analyzed data showed “little or no tendency for the academic reputation scores to
gravitate toward the overall ranking”).
93. See Stake, supra note 2, at 251 (concluding that “the U.S. News score was . . . a
predictor of the new academic ranks”); Stake & Alexeev, supra note 89, at 12 (concluding
that regression analysis of data provided “strong evidence that academics adapt their
views of the schools in the direction of the overall USN&WR rankings”).
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that were ranked in tiers.94 As a result, this author decided to test for
the presence of the echo effect in ways not previously employed.
The echo effect’s essential premise is that a relatively high U.S.
News rank (i.e., a U.S. News rank that is high relative to that
school’s academic reputation score) will lift the school’s academic
reputation score and a relatively low U.S. News rank (relative to the
school’s academic reputation score) will drag the school’s academic
reputation score down. As a first step to testing the echo effect, therefore, the author sought to quantify the relationship between each law
school’s U.S. News rank and its corresponding academic reputation
score for that year.95 This was a relatively straightforward task with
respect to law schools with specific ranks (i.e., law schools that were
not ranked in “tiers”). For each of these law schools, the author
ranked the law school according to its academic reputation score96
and then compared that rank to the school’s overall U.S. News
rank.97 That comparison provided a basis for assessing whether a law
school was “over-” or “under-ranked” for each year during the sixteen-year period. In 2013, for example, the University of California at
Los Angeles had the sixteenth-best academic reputation score in the
country (3.9). Its overall U.S. News rank was seventeenth in the
country.98 UCLA’s U.S. News rank was therefore one place lower

94. See Stake & Alexeev, supra note 89, at 6 (“We used only the rank observations
with precise USN&WR ranks. That is, we did not use the rank if only available datum was
the quartile exceeded by the school in that year.”). With respect to the echo effect, Richard
Schmalbeck focused his analysis on the top twenty-five law schools. See Schmalbeck, supra
note 1, at 577.
95. Notably, this was one of the techniques utilized by Professor Stake in his 2006
study. See Stake, supra note 2, at 251. As with his 2009 study, however, it appears that his
2006 study (at least this aspect of it) was relegated to schools with numeric ranks as opposed to those ranked in tiers.
96. In 1998, for example, the University of Michigan had the sixth highest academic
reputation score at 4.7 and therefore was assigned the rank of sixth. In order to normalize
the data and increase its accuracy, the author decided to average ties. In 1998, for example, Yale and Harvard were tied with the highest academic reputation score. As a result,
they each received a reputation rank of 1.5. The author included all schools in these computations, including those schools that were not part of the 172-school data set. This represents a slight methodological improvement over the prior longitudinal study conducted by
this author on the subject.
97. As with the academic reputation score ranks, all ties in the U.S. News ranks were
averaged. If five schools were tied for tenth in the U.S. News rankings, for example, those
five schools would all be listed with a rank of “12” in the data set rather than a rank of
“10.” Similarly, if four law schools were tied for tenth in the U.S. News rankings, all four
schools would be listed with a rank of “11.5” rather than “10.” This is the same method
employed by Richard Schmalbeck in his study of the academic reputation scores in 1998.
See Schmalbeck, supra note 1, at 569 n.5.
98. See Appendix D, available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/lawreview/ (select
Issues, Past Issues, Vol. 40, Summer 2013).
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than its academic reputation rank and in the terminology of this Article the school was very slightly under-ranked for the year 2013.99
A very slight difference between an academic reputation score and
a U.S. News rank might not be expected to influence the way academics perceive a particulate school. For the majority of schools, in
fact, academic reputation scores and U.S. News ranks track each other reasonably closely. In light of the weight assigned to the academic
reputation scores in the U.S. News methodology, one would generally
expect such a result. In some cases, however, the difference between
the U.S. News rank and the academic reputation score was more
pronounced. In 2013, for example, the University of Oregon had an
overall U.S. News rank of ninety-fourth (tied with one other school).
Oregon’s academic reputation score of 2.8, however, was quite high
for a school with that U.S. News rank. Based solely on its academic
reputation score, Oregon would have ranked fifty-first in the nation
(tied with three other schools).100 Using the terminology of this Article, Oregon was therefore significantly under-ranked. If the echo effect does in fact exist, one would expect that Oregon’s relatively low
U.S. News rank would exert a downward influence on its subsequent
academic reputation scores.
For schools ranked in tiers, a different methodology had to be employed to compare the law school’s U.S. News rank to its academic
reputation score. For tiered schools, the author computed the average
academic reputation score for all the schools in each particular tier
for each particular year and then compared every law school’s academic reputation score to the average academic reputation score for
the schools in its tier for that year.101 In 2012, for example, Valparaiso Law School was ranked in the fourth tier. Valparaiso’s 1.9 reputation score in 2012, however, was .347 higher than the 1.553 average
academic reputation score for all fourth tier schools in 2012. As a result, Valparaiso was significantly under-ranked in 2012.102
In order to test whether the academic reputation scores of law
schools were in fact being dragged down by relatively low U.S. News
ranks or being lifted up by relatively high U.S. News ranks, the au99. Note that the terms over-ranked and under-ranked are not intended to be pejorative or to have normative implications of any kind. They are merely intended to convey the
concept that a school’s U.S. News rank was higher or lower than its academic reputation
rank.
100. See Appendix D, supra note 98.
101. To compute these averages, the author included all law schools in the U.S. News
rankings for that year, including those law schools that were not part of the 172-school
data set.
102. The under- and over-ranked computations for every law school in the data set
(tiered and non-tiered) during the sixteen-year period are listed in Appendix D, supra note
98.
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thor correlated the difference between each law school’s academic
reputation score and its U.S. News rank (i.e., the extent to which the
law school was under- or over-ranked) with the change that occurred
(or did not occur) to that law school’s academic reputation score in
the immediately following year.103
In assessing whether a law school’s academic reputation score was
more likely to go down when a school was under-ranked and more
likely to go up when a school was over-ranked, the Pearson correlation coefficient was utilized to measure the correlation in the movements of the two variables (i.e., to measure the extent to which the
academic reputation scores moved in tandem with the under- or overranked status of the law schools). The Pearson correlation coefficient
is scaled between positive 1.0, meaning the two variables are perfectly correlated to one another in a positive manner, and negative 1.0,
meaning the two variables are perfectly correlated to one another in
an inverse manner. A score of 0.0 indicates there is no correlation
between the two variables. The year-by-year results are summarized
below in Table 5.

103. In this regard, the current study includes a methodological improvement from the
prior longitudinal study conducted by this author on the subject. In the current study, the
author excluded from the calculations those schools that were putatively over-ranked in
the fourth tier, that is, those schools that possessed an academic reputation score that was
relatively low for the fourth tier. The author decided that it was illogical to treat a school
as over-ranked in the fourth tier, since there are no ranking categories below the fourth
tier. In other words, it would illogical to expect a lifting influence for schools that were in
the fourth tier with relatively low academic reputation scores.
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Table 5

Year

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

Pearson’s r

.253

.346

.232

-.083

.126

.084

.189

-.063

.274

.335

Category of
Schools

Top
145

Tiered

Top
145

Tiered

Top
100

Tiered

Top
100

Tiered

Top
100

Tiered

Table 5
(continued)

Year

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

Pearson’s r

.214

.207

.392

-.002

.122

.276

.128

.070

.047

.238

Category of
Schools

Top
100

Tiered

Top
100

Tiered

Top
100

Tiered

Top
100

Tiered

Top
100

Tiered

Table 5
(continued)

Year

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

Pearson’s r

.199

.390

.388

.288

.046

.088

.133

.214

.000

-.002

Category of
Schools

Top
50

Tiered

Top
50

Tiered

Top
50

Tiered

Top
50

Tiered

Top
50

Tiered
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The results summarized in Table 5 suggest that there is a detectable correlation between whether a law school is under- or overranked and the probability that its academic reputation score will
decline or improve the following year.
For each relevant year in the period, the Pearson correlation coefficient was calculated separately for schools that had specific ranks
and schools that were ranked in tiers.104 The result is that there were
fifteen years in which two separate measures of correlation were calculated, providing thirty separate measures of correlation by which
to assess the extent to which academic reputation scores were affected
by whether a law school was under- or over-ranked in the prior year.
In twenty-four of the thirty measures (80%), there was a positive
correlation between whether a law school’s academic reputation score
went up or down and whether the school had been under- or overranked in the prior year. There was a negative correlation in only
five of the thirty measures (17%). In one of the measures, there was
no statistical correlation to three decimal points. (When that coefficient was calculated to four decimal points, there was a slight positive correlation.105) The correlations were particularly evident in the
context of the non-tiered schools, where there was only a single negative correlation out of the fifteen measures. The average correlation
coefficient for the entire period for the two categories of schools is calculated below in Table 6.
Table 6
1998 – 2013
Pearson’s r

.177

.159

Category of
Schools

Non-tiered

Tiered

In summary, the data reveals that an over-ranked law school was
statistically more likely to see its academic reputation score go up the
following year than go down and an under-ranked law school was
statistically more likely to see its academic reputation score go down
the following year than up. This finding is consistent with the propo104. It was necessary to calculate the coefficients separately for these two categories of
schools because, as described above, the measures used to compare the schools’ U.S. News
ranks and reputation scores were different.
105. The figure was .0004.
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sition that there is at least a slight echo effect between a law school’s
academic reputation score and its overall U.S. News rank.
The fact that the Pearson correlation coefficients are relatively
small is not surprising in the context of the academic reputation
scores. One would not expect a high correlation coefficient in light of
the low volatility in academic reputation scores generally (that is, in
any given year the vast majority of schools do not see any change to
their academic reputation score) and in light of the large number of
variables that can affect academic reputation scores over time.106
What seems significant is the fact that the correlations were overwhelmingly positive. That fact suggests that U.S. News ranks exert
at least a slight influence on academic reputation scores. It should
also be noted that the Pearson correlation coefficients from the 2013
data were relatively high. Seven of the ten schools that were able to
improve their academic reputation scores in 2013, for example, were
over-ranked in 2012.107
In order to test for the echo effect still further, the author decided
to isolate those instances where the phenomenon could be expected to
operate with greatest force. To do this, the author identified those
law schools that had exhibited the largest disparities between their
U.S. News ranks and their academic reputation scores. In addition,
the author posited that those disparities were most likely to affect
the voting patterns of academics when the disparities were of a durable nature. If a voting academic were to repeatedly see a law school
under- or over-ranked for a period of several years, this author posited that the disparity was more likely to influence the way the academic perceived the law school than if the disparity were more fleeting.
As a result, the author isolated a sub-set of law schools that were
significantly under- or over-ranked for periods of at least four consecutive years. For purposes of the study, a significant disparity between the U.S. News rank and the academic reputation score was
defined as one in which a non-tiered law school had an academic reputation score that was either ten places higher or ten places lower
than its U.S. News rank.108 For tiered schools, a significant disparity
was defined as one in which the law school’s academic reputation
106. The average number of schools each year that retained their same academic reputation score from the prior year was 97.40. See supra note 46.
107. Those seven schools were: CUNY, Brigham Young University, University of Buffalo – SUNY, University of New Mexico, University of Notre Dame, University of Utah, and
Villanova University. See Appendix D, supra note 98. The three under-ranked schools that
managed to improve their academic reputation scores in 2013 were: the University of Denver, Santa Clara University, and the University of Hawaii – Manoa. See id.
108. The figures were rounded so a disparity of 9.5 was characterized as “significant.”
All of the results can be viewed in Appendix D, supra note 98.
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score was at least .3 greater or lower than the academic reputation
score average for all schools in its tier.109
Table 7 below lists all those law schools in the data set that were
significantly under-ranked for at least four consecutive years during
the period. The table reveals there were twenty-one such law schools
that experienced periods of four or more years where their academic
reputation scores were significantly lower than their U.S. News rankings. For every year during these periods, the author examined what
occurred to these schools’ academic reputation scores in the subsequent year.110 Two of the schools (University of Pittsburgh and University of Wisconsin – Madison) are listed twice in the table because
they each had two non-consecutive four-year periods where their academic reputation scores were significantly lower than their U.S.
News rankings.
All of the under-ranked schools listed in Table 7 below, according
to the echo effect theory, would have faced the prospect of having
their academic reputation scores “dragged” down by their relatively
low U.S. News ranks. Academics looking at these schools in the U.S.
News would have consistently seen these schools with relatively low
U.S. News rankings (relative to their academic reputation scores)
and therefore would have been (according to the echo effect theory)
slightly more likely to give these law schools a lower academic reputation score that more closely matched their U.S. News rank.

109. These figures were also rounded. Id.
110. Note that whether a law school was under-ranked in 2013 was irrelevant to the
analysis because in those cases there was no subsequent year to consult for the correlation.
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Table 7
Law Schools that Were Under-Ranked for Four or More Consecutive Years
Between 1998 – 2012

School

Case Western Reserve University
Catholic Univ. of America (Columbus)
CUNY
Hamline University
Hofstra University (Deane)
Indiana University – Indianapolis
Rutgers, State U. of New Jersey – Newark
Santa Clara University
Southern Illinois University – Carbondale
Syracuse University
University of California – Hastings
University of Dayton
University of Florida (Levin)
University of Miami
University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill
University of Oregon
University of Pittsburgh
University of Pittsburgh
University of Tulsa
University of Wisconsin – Madison
University of Wisconsin – Madison
Valparaiso University
Wayne State University
Total
Prorated Average

Period of Consecutive Years Being
Under-Ranked

Number
of Years
in
Period

1998 – 2002

5

Change
Related to
UnderRanked
Period
-0.3

2002 – 2010

9

-0.2

2007 – 2010

4

0.1

2009 – 2012

4

-0.1

2005 – 2009

5

0.0

2009 – 2012

4

0.0

2009 – 2012

4

-0.1

2003 – 2007

5

0.2

2008 – 2011

4

-0.3

2002 – 2009

8

0.0

2001 – 2006

6

-0.3

2007 – 2012

6

-0.1

2007 – 2010

4

0.0

2002 – 2012

11

-0.1

2006 – 2012

7

-0.1

1998 – 2012

15

-0.1

2008 – 2012

5

-0.1

1998 – 2001

4

-0.2

2002 – 2009

8

0.0

2003 – 2007

5

-0.3

1998 – 2001

4

-0.1

2007 – 2012

6

-0.1

2002 – 2005

4

-0.1

137

-2.3
-0.230

2013]

LAW SCHOOL ACADEMIC REPUTATION

769

The results of Table 7 are consistent with the existence of an echo
effect. As Table 7 reveals, the twenty-one law schools that experienced extended periods of being significantly under-ranked did in
fact suffer declines to their academic reputation scores that were considerably worse than the average declines experienced by law schools
generally between 1998 and 2013. Table 7 reveals that the total aggregate loss by these schools during these periods was 2.3 points.111
When one prorates that rate of decline for the entire sixteen-year period, the average decline would have been .230 per school.112 That decline is almost three times greater than the .088 decline suffered by
law schools generally during the period.
Table 8 below represents the same data for all those law schools
that were significantly over-ranked for at least four consecutive years
between 1998 and 2012.

111. Only two of these twenty-one under-ranked law schools (CUNY and Santa Clara)
were able to raise their academic reputation scores during their periods of being underranked. See supra Table 7.
112. With respect to prorating the results, one year was added to every period at issue
because the under-ranked status was always correlated to the movement in the academic
reputation score that occurred in the subsequent year. As a result, the number of years
encompassed by the chart was calculated as 160. That figure was then divided by sixteen
(the total number of years in the period) and the result (ten) was used as a divisor for the
2.3 aggregate decline.
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Table
8
Law Schools that Were Over-Ranked for Four or More Consecutive Years
Between 1998 – 2012
Period of
Consecutive
Years Being
Over-Ranked

Number
of Years
in
Period

Change
Related to
OverRanked
Period

Change
for
Other
Years

Baylor University

2003 – 2012

10

-0.1

-0.2

Brigham Young University (Clark)

1998 – 2006

9

-0.1

0.1

Campbell University

2000 – 2003

4

0.1

-0.2

George Mason University

2001 – 2012

12

0.1

0.0

Georgia State University

2007 – 2012

6

0.2

0.1

Lewis & Clark College (Northwestern)
Louisiana State University – Baton
Rouge

2008 – 2012

5

0.1

0.0

2008 – 2012

5

0.0

0.0

Loyola University Chicago

2003 – 2006

4

0.0

0.0

Mercer University (George)

2003 – 2007

5

0.1

-0.1

Northern Illinois University

1998 – 2002

5

-0.1

0.0

Ohio Northern University (Pettit)

2008 – 2011

4

-0.1

0.1

Pennsylvania State University

2005 – 2009

5

0.3

-0.2

Pepperdine University

2005 – 2012

8

0.4

0.0

Southern Methodist University

2004 – 2012

9

-0.2

-0.2

St. John's University

2001 – 2005

5

0.0

-0.1

University of Alabama

2006 – 2009

4

0.3

0.0

University of Alabama

1999 – 2004

6

0.2

University of Cincinnati

2005 – 2011

7

0.0

-0.2

University of Kentucky

2008 – 2012

5

0.0

0.0

University of Kentucky

2001 – 2005

5

-0.1

University of Louisville (Brandeis)

1999 – 2005

7

0.2

0.0

University of Memphis (Humphreys)

1999 – 2002

4

0.0

0.0

University of Richmond (Williams)

2001 – 2009

9

0.2

-0.4

University of the Pacific (McGeorge)

2005 – 2008

4

0.1

-0.4

Washington and Lee University

1998 – 2003

6

-0.1

0.0

School

Total
Prorated Average

153

1.5

-1.7

.135

-.153
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The results of Table 8 provide additional support for the existence
of the echo effect. As demonstrated in Table 8, there were twentythree law schools that were significantly over-ranked for at least four
consecutive years between 1998 and 2012.113 According to the underlying premise of the echo effect theory, one would expect that these
relatively high U.S. News rankings would exert a lifting influence on
the schools’ academic reputation scores during these periods in which
they enjoyed relatively high U.S. News rankings.
The results of Table 8 show that the academic reputation scores of
these twenty-three schools did in fact tend to go up while the schools
were enjoying their periods of relatively high U.S. News rankings. In
stark contrast to the schools in Table 7, and in contrast to the general
trend downward in academic reputation scores during the period,
these twenty-three schools as a group managed to improve their academic reputation scores with relative success. Of the twenty-three
law schools in Table 8, eleven were able to raise their academic reputation scores during their periods of relatively high U.S. News rankings while only seven of the law schools suffered declines during
those periods. As a group, the twenty-three law schools listed in Table 8 managed to raise their academic reputation scores by an aggregate of 1.5 points during their periods of being over-ranked. When
one prorates that rate of improvement for the entire sixteen-year period, the average improvement would have been .135 per school, a
substantial difference from the .088 decline that prevailed among all
law schools generally.114
Perhaps the most persuasive evidence of an echo effect can be
found in what occurred to the twenty-three law schools listed in Table 8 during those years when they were not consistently overranked. The collective academic reputation scores of the twenty-three
law schools in Table 8 actually went down in those years when they
were not enjoying at least four consecutive years of relatively high
U.S. News rankings. In fact, the prorated decline of these schools for
the periods when they were not consistently over-ranked was -.153, a
decline nearly twice the -.088 average that prevailed among law
schools generally during the period.115 This fact suggests that the academic reputation score movements for these schools were significantly related to whether the schools were enjoying periods of
113. Again, whether a law school was over-ranked in 2013 was irrelevant to the analysis because in that case there was no subsequent year to consult for the correlation.
114. As with the under-ranked schools, one year was added to all of the relevant periods in order to prorate. The result was a total of 178 years. That figure was then divided by
the sixteen years to arrive at 11.125. That figure was then used as a divisor for the 1.5
aggregate increase.
115. The same method of proration was utilized to calculate the decrease. See supra
note 114.
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consistently high U.S. News ranks relative to their academic
reputation scores.
As a final inquiry, the author calculated the Pearson correlation
coefficients for these significantly under- and over-ranked law schools
listed in Tables 7 and 8. The coefficients were calculated only for
those years when the schools experienced periods of relatively high or
low U.S. News rankings. The results are listed below in Table 9.
Table 9
Under- and Over-Ranked Schools During their
Periods of Relatively High/Low U.S. News Rankings
Pearson’s r

.194

.289

Category of
Schools

Non-tiered

Tiered

Note that these Pearson correlation coefficients are significantly
higher than the coefficients that were calculated for all schools and
all years.116 In context, these coefficient figures seem large enough to
substantiate a discernible echo effect whereby the U.S. News rankings exert an influence on the movement of law school academic reputation scores. This influence of the U.S. News rankings may be relatively slight when compared to the myriad other factors influencing
academic reputation scores and the overarching tendency of academic
reputation scores to remain stable. At least in cases where law
schools experience durable periods of relatively high or low U.S.
News rankings, however, the data suggests that those U.S. News
rankings do tend to drag or lift the schools’ academic reputation
scores in ways that they might not otherwise move in the absence of
the echo effect.

116. See supra Table 6.
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IV. LAW SCHOOLS THAT EXPERIENCED THE MOST SIGNIFICANT
CHANGES TO THEIR ACADEMIC REPUTATION SCORES DURING THE
STUDIED PERIOD
The last Part of the Article will be devoted to identifying those law
schools whose academic reputation scores have improved or declined
by the greatest margins during the studied period, along with a brief
discussion regarding some of the factors that may have contributed to
these changes.
A. Law Schools that Experienced Most Significant Declines
Table 10 below lists all those law schools whose academic reputation scores declined by .3 or more between 1998 and 2013.
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Table 10

Laws Schools that Declined by .3 or More Between 1998 and 2013

2013 Peer
Assessment
Score

1998 Peer
Assessment
Score

Change
Between
1998 and
2013

University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign

3.1

3.6

-0.5

Wayne State University

2.1

2.6

-0.5

Case Western Reserve University

2.7

3.1

-0.4

Illinois Institute of Technology (Chicago-Kent)

2.5

2.9

-0.4

New York Law School

1.9

2.3

-0.4

St. Louis University

2.0

2.4

-0.4

St. Mary's University

1.6

2.0

-0.4

Southern Methodist University (Dedman)

2.5

2.9

-0.4

University of Wisconsin – Madison

3.4

3.8

-0.4

Villanova University

2.3

2.7

-0.4

Baylor University

2.3

2.6

-0.3

Duquesne University

1.8

2.1

-0.3

New England School of Law

1.6

1.9

-0.3

Rutgers, State U. of New Jersey – Camden

2.4

2.7

-0.3

Rutgers, State U. of New Jersey – Newark

2.5

2.8

-0.3

Tulane University

3.0

3.3

-0.3

University of California (Hastings)

3.2

3.5

-0.3

University of Iowa

3.3

3.6

-0.3

University of Kansas

2.6

2.9

-0.3

University of Michigan – Ann Arbor

4.4

4.7

-0.3

University of Minnesota – Twin Cities

3.5

3.8

-0.3

University of Nebraska – Lincoln

2.4

2.7

-0.3

University of Pittsburgh

2.7

3.0

-0.3

University of the Pacific (McGeorge)

2.0

2.3

-0.3

University of South Dakota

1.8

2.1

-0.3

University of Washington

3.1

3.4

-0.3

Whittier College

1.3

1.6

-0.3

School
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There is little mystery regarding the decline of two of the law
schools listed in Table 10. In 2012, the University of Illinois and Villanova University each dropped .4 points in their academic reputation scores. Undoubtedly these precipitous drops were related largely, if not entirely, to the schools’ recent misconduct in reporting their
student admission numbers.117 In the absence of those scandals, it is
extremely unlikely that either of the schools would have been in Table 11. As of 2011, the academic reputation scores for both schools
were just .1 below their 1998 figures. Similarly, St. Louis University’s presence on the list is attributable entirely to the .4 plunge it endured to its academic reputation score in 2013. In the case of St. Louis University, the sudden drop was almost certainly related to the
discord experienced in 2012 between the institution’s law school and
university administrations.118
It should be noted that the sudden declines for these three institutions were unprecedented for the period. Prior to 2012, no other law
school had dropped by such a large margin in a single year. The only
other instance between 1998 and 2013 where a law school’s academic
reputation score fell by more than .2 in a single year occurred in
2009, when Loyola Marymount’s name was reported differently on
the U.S. News survey and the school’s score dropped .3 points.119 Loyola regained that entire loss to its academic reputation score in the
very next year, however, when the nomenclature was clarified.120

117. Officials from Villanova Law School admitted in early 2011 that the school had
submitted false admissions numbers to the ABA and U.S. News for several prior years. See
Letter from John Y. Gotanda, Dean, Villanova Law School, to Villanova Law School Alumni, reprinted in Elie Mystal, Villanova Law ‘Knowingly Reported’ Inaccurate Information to
the ABA, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 4, 2011, 3:34 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2011/02/
villanova-law-school-knowingly-reported-inaccurate-information-to-the-aba/
[hereinafter
Gotanda Letter]. An internal study at the University of Illinois revealed that the school
had reported false admissions numbers in six of the seven class years between 2008 and
2014. See Jodi S. Cohen, A University of Illinois Law Dean Resigns after Report
Details Manipulations of Admissions Data, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 8, 2011),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-11-08/news/ct-met-u-of-i-law-school-1108-20111108
_1_lsat-score-test-scores-data-analysis. For a discussion of both transgressions, see Karen Sloan, Law Schools’ Credibility at Issue, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.law.com/
jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202514708103&slreturn=1
(LexisNexis subscription required to access the full article).
118. See Resignation Letter from Annette E. Clark, Dean, St. Louis Univ. Sch. of Law,
to Lawrence Biondi, President, St. Louis Univ. (Aug. 8, 2012), available at
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2012/08/st-louis.html.
119. See Appendix A, supra note 11. With respect to the impact of Loyola’s name
change in the U.S. News survey, see, for example, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCHOOL REPORTS
(July 17, 2009), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2009/07/why-did-loyola-lawschool-falls-in-us-news-because-the-magazine-changed-the-schools-name-and-it-repu.html
(summarizing effect of the name change and quoting statement from Dean of Loyola Law
School).
120. See Appendix A, supra note 11.
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To put these sudden declines in perspective, consider the number
of academics that would have been required to change their scores in
order to drive the overall academic reputation scores down by the .4
margin. There were approximately 500 academics who returned surveys to U.S. News in 2012.121 Utilizing the University of Illinois as
our example, let us assume that 80% of the surveys returned in 2012
included a score for that institution.122 Let us also assume, to simplify
the illustration, that the University of Illinois had received 200 votes
of “3” and 200 votes of “4” in 2011 (in order to receive its score of 3.5
for that year) and that the 200 academics who had given a score of
“3” in 2011 decided to give the school that same score in 2012.123 If all
those assumptions were true, then 141 of the 200 academics (71%)
who had previously given Illinois a score of “4” in 2011 would have
had to lower their score to “3” in order to drive the school’s average
down to the reported 3.1.124
It is interesting to consider why so many academics voted differently for these three institutions in 2012 and 2013. With respect to
the University of Illinois and Villanova University, it is possible that
the voting academics interpreted the transgressions as institutional
failings to some extent.125 Another potential explanation for those two
121. U.S. News generally sends surveys to law schools after they have been provisionally accredited. There were approximately 200 such schools in the summer/fall of 2011,
when the surveys were distributed for the 2012 rankings. The response rate for the surveys
in 2012 was 63%. See Robert Morse & Sam Flanigan, Methodology: Law School Rankings,
U.S. N EWS & W ORLD REPORT (Mar. 12, 2012), http://web.archive.org/web/
20120414094419/http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/
articles/2012/03/12/methodology-law-school-rankings. The total number of surveys used to
calculate the 2012 reputation scores, therefore, was between 500 and 507.
122. This figure is complete speculation in light of the fact that U.S. News only reveals
the total response rate for the surveys rather than the individual response rates for each
law school. The fact that some law schools might be scored in only a small fraction of the
total surveys returned is a potentially problematic aspect of the scores. I owe this observation to Brian Tamanaha.
123. This is not to suggest that this was the most likely voting scenario to cause the
decline. One would think that the most likely scenario was that at least a few academics
lowered Illinois’ score all the way to 2. The particular scenario above was utilized because
it illustrated most simply the type of voting alterations required to create changes of this
magnitude.
124. Those figures would drive the score down to 3.148, which would be rounded to 3.1
by U.S. News.
125. One could argue that the scandals were reflections, at least to some extent, of
their institutional contexts. See TAMANAHA, supra note 3, at 76-83 (discussing institutional
setting that contributed to misreporting at University of Illinois); Sloan, supra note 117
(observing that “law school administrators feel extreme pressure to keep their ranking
up”). It is important to note, however, that there is no evidence that law faculty participated in the misreporting at either institution. See TAMANAHA, supra note 3, at 83 (noting that
internal investigation at Illinois placed “entire blame” for false reporting on admissions
dean but concluding nonetheless that “institutional obsession with achieving ranking
benchmarks had warped internal policies”); Gotanda Letter, supra note 117 (reporting that
law faculty were responsible for uncovering and reporting transgression at Villanova).
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institutions derives from the fact that the previous misreporting had
misled academics about the qualifications of the student bodies at the
two schools. Insofar as academic reputation scores reflect the academic qualifications of student bodies, the numerical corrections in
this regard would be expected to drive the academic reputation scores
downward to some extent. The controversies at the three institutions,
however, would not appear to have had much effect on the other factors normally thought to influence academic reputation scores. Little
turnover has occurred, for example, in the compositions of the faculties of the three institutions. The very same year that the University
of Illinois and Villanova University suffered their precipitous drops
in academic reputation scores, for example, Villanova maintained its
reputation score among lawyers and judges and the University of Illinois actually gained .1 to its lawyer/judge reputation score.126 Similarly, the lawyer/judge reputation score for St. Louis University did
not decline in 2013.127
It is interesting to speculate, therefore, whether the sudden drops
for the University of Illinois and Villanova University reflected to
some extent an effort by the voting academics to deter similar misconduct in the zero-sum game of the U.S. News rankings.128 Similarly, the drop in the score for the law school at St. Louis University
might constitute, at least to some extent, an effort to deter universities from encroaching upon the autonomy of their law schools, as St.
Louis University allegedly did to its law school in 2012. Perhaps the
future will reveal more about the logic behind these three declines
126. See Best Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (2012), http://web.archive.org
/web/20120430204533/http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduateschools/top-law-schools. The lawyer/judge reputation scores for both law schools remained
at their same levels in the 2013 rankings. See Best Law School Rankings, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT (2013), http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduateschools/top-law-schools/law-rankings (last visited June 29, 2013).
127. See Best Law School Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (2013), http://gradschools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/lawrankings (last visited June 29, 2013).
128. In fact, one could even maintain that the echo effect makes this type of punishment necessary. In light of the fact that the U.S. News rankings have the potential to lift
academic reputation scores, a law school that improves its independent U.S. News variables through misrepresentation might not only secure an immediate improvement in its
U.S. News rank but also might secure an additional gain down the road if that higher U.S.
News rank lifts its academic reputation score through the echo effect. If so, merely returning the independent numbers to their correct levels would not adequately punish the
transgressions because the school would still be left with the residual gain to its academic
reputation score. According to the echo effect, the lowering of the independent variables
would result in a drop in the school’s U.S. News rank, which would then be expected to
drag down the school’s academic reputation score. Theoretically, however, the school would
not be expected to return completely to its pre-transgression level solely by virtue of the
corrections because of the inertial impact of the higher reputation score when it was rising
(i.e., the “echoed” higher reputation score in itself lifted the U.S. News rank higher).
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when subsequent surveys reveal the extent to which they are durable. In 2013, the University of Illinois failed to gain back any of its
2012 decline but Villanova University has already succeeded in recouping one-fourth of its decline.129
In terms of the other schools in Table 9, a wide variety of factors
may have contributed to the declines in academic reputation scores.
It seems quite possible, for example, that the echo effect contributed
to the losses suffered by some of these schools. Six of the law schools
in Table 9 were among the schools listed in Table 7 as being consistently and significantly under-ranked in the U.S. News rankings
(Case Western Reserve University, Rutgers – Newark, University of
California (Hastings), University of Pittsburgh, University of Wisconsin – Madison, and Wayne State University).130 The academic
reputation scores for all of those schools, therefore, quite likely suffered from their consistent status as under-ranked schools.
It should be noted that three of the law schools appearing in Table
10 were among those listed in Table 8 as consistently over-ranked
schools (Baylor University, Southern Methodist University, and the
University of the Pacific (McGeorge)).131 That may appear to be an
anomaly according to the echo effect but note that a disproportionate
share of those three schools’ declines occurred outside the periods
when they enjoyed their relatively high U.S. News rankings. In the
case of the University of the Pacific (McGeorge), for example, the law
school actually improved its academic reputation score by .1 during
the period when it was consistently over-ranked but appears in Table
10 by virtue of its .4 decline during those periods when it was not
consistently over-ranked.
B. Law Schools that Experienced Most Significant Gains
Table 11 reveals the eight law schools in the data set that managed to improve their academic reputation scores by .3 or more during the studied period.
Once again, the echo effect may be responsible for some of these
changes. Of the eight schools in Table 11, three were among the overranked schools in Table 8 whose consistently high U.S. News rankings (relative to their academic reputation scores) could be expected
to help lift their academic reputation scores. Those three law schools
were Georgia State University, Pepperdine University, and University of Alabama. Only one of the law schools in Table 11 was among
the consistently under-ranked schools found in Table 7 (CUNY).
129. See Appendix A, supra note 11.
130. See supra Table 7.
131. See supra Table 8.
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Table 11
Laws Schools that Improved by .3 or More
Between 1998 and 2013

Michigan State
University
University of Alabama
Pepperdine University
Seattle University
CUNY
Florida State University
Georgia State
University
Gonzaga University

2013 Peer
Assessment
Score

1998 Peer
Assessment
Score

Change
Between
1998 and
2013

2.3

1.8

0.5

3.0
2.6
2.4
2.1
2.9

2.5
2.2
2.0
1.8
2.6

0.5
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.3

2.5

2.2

0.3

2.2

1.9

0.3

With respect to at least one of the schools in Table 11, furthermore, a name change may have contributed to the rise in the school’s
academic reputation score.132 In April of 2004, the law school that had
once been known as The Detroit College of Law officially changed its
name to the Michigan State University College of Law.133 Prior to
2005, the surveys sent to academics by U.S. News listed the school as
Michigan State – Detroit College of Law.134 Starting with the fall
2004 survey (incorporated into the 2005 rankings), the school’s name
on the surveys was listed simply as Michigan State University.135
Chart P illustrates the apparent correlation.

132. For a discussion of the relationship between state-named schools and U.S. News
reputation scores, see Seto, supra note 1, at 518 (“The possibility that name recognition is a
factor in the reputational surveys is bolstered by yet another finding: schools named after
the state within which they are located, regardless of whether public or private, appear to
be overranked nationwide, picking up an average of 1.26 overall score points as a result.”).
133. Michigan State University, MSU Law School Name Change Reflects Integration
and Collaboration, MSU TODAY (Apr. 16, 2004), http://msutoday.msu.edu/news/2004/msulaw-school-name-change-reflects-integration-and-collaboration/.
134. Author’s Telephone Interview with Samuel Flanigan, supra note 6.
135. Id.
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Chart P

That is not to say that other factors did not contribute to Michigan
State’s improvement during the period. The timing reflected in Chart
P suggests, however, that the decision by the school’s leadership to
officially partner with a major research institution, and to change the
school’s name to reflect that partnership, contributed to the rapid
rise in the school’s academic reputation score.
Undoubtedly there are a number of other ways in which a law
school’s administration can, at least under certain circumstances,
significantly influence its school’s academic reputation score. It is
quite possible, for example, that Pepperdine University’s substantial
gains over the period (a rise of .4) could in some ways be related to
the notoriety of that law school’s dean (Kenneth Starr). Chart Q plots
Pepperdine’s academic reputation scores with the timing of Starr’s
arrival and departure at the school.136

136. Kenneth Starr was announced as the new President of Baylor University in February of 2010, after having served as Dean of Pepperdine University School of Law since
2004. See Carol J. Williams, Kenneth Starr to Leave Pepperdine to Become President of
Baylor University, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2010), available at http://articles.latimes.com/
2010/feb/16/local/la-me-ken-starr16-2010feb16.
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Chart Q

Another potentially positive influence on the schools’ academic
reputation scores is the set of specialty rankings published by U.S.
News in conjunction with the overall rankings. It is possible, for example, that Pepperdine University’s and Seattle University’s regular
appearances at the top spot of the U.S. News rankings for dispute
resolution and legal writing, respectively, could have contributed to
their success in raising their academic reputation scores.137 In fact, a
number of other law schools that dominated the top positions of the
specialty rankings succeeded in improving (or at least maintaining)
their academic reputation scores. Stetson University, which finished
in the top position (including ties) of the trial advocacy specialty on
thirteen occasions during the studied period, finished the period
137. Pepperdine University finished in the top position (including ties) for the dispute
resolution specialty on twelve occasions during the sixteen-year period, including every
year since 2005. The top position for every specialty ranking since 1998 has been compiled
in Appendix E, available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/lawreview/ (select Issues, Past
Issues, Vol. 40, Summer 2013). U.S. News began compiling the specialty ranking for Legal
Writing in 2005. In the nine years for which that specialty ranking has been in existence,
Seattle University has finished in the top position (including ties) on six occasions. See
Appendix E, supra. The other school which has most often garnered the top position in the
dispute resolution specialty is the University of Missouri, which finished in the top position
(including ties) on five occasions between 1998 and 2004. Id. The University of Missouri
finished the studied period with an academic reputation score that was .2 lower than the
score with which it began, although it should be noted that the school did not first fall below its 1998 baseline until three years after it occupied the top position in the specialty
ranking. See Appendix A, supra note 11.
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up .1.138 Lewis & Clark College and Vermont Law School, the two
schools appearing most often at the top of the environmental law
ranking, finished the period with academic reputation scores that
were up .1 and level, respectively.139 Mercer University, often at or
near the top of the legal writing specialty along with Seattle University, finished the period level.140 A number of law schools at the top of
the specialty rankings, therefore, managed to improve their academic
reputation scores during the course of the period or at least to evade
the .088 decline that prevailed among law schools generally.
It should be noted, however, that some of the law schools atop the
specialty rankings did not fare as well. St. Louis University, often
ranked number one in the health law specialty, fell precipitously in
2013 and is discussed in the prior subsection.141 The three elite
schools that consistently took top spots in the specialty rankings also
fell during the course of the studied period. New York University
(both international law and tax law) and the University of California
at Berkeley (intellectual property law) both declined by .2 during the
studied period.142 Georgetown (clinical training) finished the period
down by .1.143
138. See Appendix A, supra note 11 (regarding the change in academic reputation);
Appendix E, supra note 137 (regarding the specialty rankings). Temple University has also
fared well in the trial advocacy ranking, finishing in the top position (including ties) on six
occasions between 1998 and 2004. See Appendix E, supra note 137. Temple University
finished the studied period with the same academic reputation score with which it began.
See Appendix A, supra note 11.
139. Vermont Law School has finished in the top position of the environmental law
specialty on eleven occasions during the studied period. See Appendix E, supra note 137.
Lewis & Clark College finished in the top position of the specialty on five occasions between 1998 and 2008. Id. With respect to the academic reputation scores of the two schools,
see Appendix A, supra note 11.
140. Mercer University has finished in the top position (including ties) of the legal writing specialty on five occasions since 2005. See Appendix E, supra note 137. With respect to
the school’s academic reputation score, see Appendix A, supra note 11.
141. St. Louis University finished in the top position of the health law ranking on eleven occasions during the studied period, including every year since 2004. See Appendix E,
supra note 137. As discussed previously, the school’s academic reputation score was level
until its precipitous drop in 2013. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. The University of Houston finished in the top position of the health law ranking on five occasions between 1998 and 2003. The school finished the studied period with an academic reputation
score that was .2 lower than the score with which it began. See Appendix A, supra note 11.
142. New York University finished in the top position of the tax law specialty every
year during the studied period. See Appendix E, supra note 137. The school finished in the
top position (including ties) of the international law specialty on fifteen occasions during
the studied period. Id. The University of California – Berkeley finished in the top position
(including ties) of the intellectual property law specialty on fourteen occasions during the
studied period. Id. With respect to the schools’ changes in academic reputation scores, see
Appendix A, supra note 11.
143. Georgetown University finished atop the clinical training specialty on fifteen occasions during the sixteen year period. See Appendix E, supra note 137. With respect to the
school’s change in academic reputation score, see Appendix A, supra note 11.
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In terms of the 1998 U.S. News ranks of the schools that improved
and declined the most during the period, Charts R and S illustrate
how the two groups of law schools compare.
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As Chart S illustrates, the group of schools that declined by .3 or
more was dominated by the higher-ranked schools. There were five
law schools in that group that began the period with a U.S. News
rank in the top twenty-five. Three additional law schools in the group
began the period with a U.S. News rank in the top fifty. All told, over
70% of the law schools that lost .3 or more began the period with a
U.S. News rank in the top ninety.
In contrast, Chart R reveals that not a single one of the law
schools that improved by .3 or more was ranked at the beginning of
the period in the top fifty by U.S. News. Over 60% of the law schools
that improved by .3 or more, furthermore, began the period in the
third or fourth tiers of the U.S. News rankings. This disparity is consistent with the generally inverse correlation between a law school’s
ability to improve its academic reputation score during the period and
the strength of its U.S. News rank and academic reputation score.
In the end, there could be many factors that contributed to the
changes in the academic reputation scores for the law schools listed
in Tables 10 and 11. This Article has highlighted just a few of the factors that appear to have contributed to those changes (i.e., name
recognition, specialty rankings, changes in administration, strength
of U.S. News rank, and the echo effect). A litany of other factors,
however, is also commonly thought to influence academic reputation
scores. Among these are scholarly productivity, lateral and entry level hiring, student selectivity, and the various ways in which schools
seek to promote their brands.144 Further analysis and experimentation might tell us which of these other factors (if any) may have contributed to the successes and failures of the law schools listed in Tables 10 and 11. While that analysis is beyond the scope of this Article,
the identification of the law schools that have experienced the greatest changes could help inform future efforts to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the factors that influence academic
reputation scores.

144. See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, The Emerging Importance of Law Review Rankings for
Law School Rankings, 2003-2007, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 35 (2007) (analyzing potential correlation between the success of law reviews (in terms of citations) and the academic reputation scores of the institutions associated with those journals); Theodore Eisenberg, Assessing the SSRN-Based Law School Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 285 (2006) (analyzing potential
correlations between SSRN rankings and other rankings); see also Cunningham, supra
note 8.

786

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:721

V. CONCLUSION
In light of the pivotal role the U.S. News rankings have come to
play in American legal education today, the U.S. News academic reputation scores have taken on increased importance. Unfortunately for
law school faculty and administrators, however, an analysis of the
past sixteen years demonstrates that it is extremely difficult to improve those scores. Only eight law schools in the data set were able to
improve their academic reputation scores by more than .2 points over
the last sixteen years. Only eighteen law schools out of the 172 in the
data set were able to improve their scores by more than .1 over the
studied period. In light of how many resources were devoted during
the period to the improvement of academic reputation scores, there is
a cautionary quality to such statistics.
Do the findings of this study suggest that law schools should
abandon their efforts to improve their academic reputation scores?
The data certainly suggests that an obsession with academic reputation scores is counterproductive. The likelihood that a law school can
significantly improve its academic reputation score is sufficiently low
that one has to question whether all such efforts are justified from a
cost-benefit standpoint.145 On the other hand, one could argue (like
the Red Queen from Through the Looking Glass) that large amounts
of effort are required simply to stay in the same place.146 It is difficult
to test for such a hypothesis because there are so many ways in
which law schools can attempt to alter their reputations among academics. It is conceivable, however, that the downward trend in academic reputation scores could have been more pronounced had the
majority of schools not been expending so many resources to maintain their scores.
In all likelihood, few law schools are going to relent in their efforts
to positively impact their academic reputation scores as long as the
scores continue to play a central role in the U.S. News methodology.
145. A similar conclusion was reached by another scholar who conducted an extensive
empirical study of the scores:
Perhaps those schools that appear to have decided that ceaseless self-promotion
is the only way to maintain or improve their place in the pecking order can be
reassured that the inertial forces acting on law school reputation are so powerful that they are unlikely to improve their ranks no matter how hard they try,
but equally unlikely to lose ground if they simply continue (more quietly) to do
what they do well.
Schmalbeck, supra note 1, at 587.
146. The Red Queen’s full statement to Alice was, “Now, here, you see, it takes all the
running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you
must run at least twice as fast as that!” LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS
AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 50 (Phila., Henry Altemus Co. 1897).
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The success of the handful of law schools that have significantly improved since 1998 provides a tantalizing lure. This study has therefore attempted to identify and isolate a few of the factors that are
most likely to influence academic reputation scores. Among other
things, the study has helped establish the likelihood that there is an
echo effect between a law school’s academic reputation score and its
overall U.S. News rank, particularly in situations where a law school
is significantly under- or over-ranked in U.S. News for several consecutive years. The implication is that law schools may be able to
positively affect their academic reputation scores simply by improving (preferably for a period of several consecutive years) the other
factors that contribute to their U.S. News rank. Schools that can improve their reputation score among lawyers and judges or the numeric indicators of their incoming classes, for example, may be able to
positively impact their academic reputation scores simply by virtue of
the echo effect. The study also identified name recognition, administration changes, and the U.S. News specialty rankings as additional
factors that have the potential to improve academic reputation scores.
The important normative question raised by this study, however,
is whether the academic reputation scores are even a valid basis for
constructing the U.S. News rankings. The downward trend to the
scores over the last sixteen years strongly suggests that strategic
considerations are playing a significant role in the formulation of the
scores. The notion that strategic considerations have skewed the results of the voting, furthermore, is supported by the fact that the
studied period was characterized by an inverse correlation between
academic reputation scores and U.S. News ranks on the one hand
and the likelihood that academic reputation scores would improve on
the other. It seems incongruent that we rely so heavily on a form of
assessment for law schools that would be categorically dismissed as
biased in any other business context. Perhaps the answer is that legal education is not simply a business. I certainly would like to think
so. The very influence of the U.S. News rankings on the way legal education is provided today, however, suggests something to the contrary.
Perhaps the time has come for U.S. News to eliminate or reduce
the weight assigned to the academic reputation scores in its ranking
methodology. The echo effect undermines the notion that the academic reputation scores add something meaningful to the methodology. A
reduction in the weight assigned to the scores might encourage law
schools to expend their resources in more socially beneficial ways and
might help mitigate the influence of strategic considerations in
the voting.
If the academic reputation scores are to persist as a central feature of the U.S. News rankings, this author proposes four changes to
the U.S. News methodology that would help improve the integrity of
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the results and mitigate the influence of strategic considerations and
implicit bias.147 First, voting academics should be barred from ranking their own institutions in the survey. The fact that the surveys do
not already contain this basic limitation suggests that the U.S. News
methodology is premised on the unrealistic assumption that strategic
considerations and implicit bias are not factors in the voting. Second,
as has already been proposed by Theodore Seto, the very highest and
lowest votes for each law school should be eliminated from the tabulations in order to control for outliers and the distorting effect they
can have on the validity of the results.148 A small number of voting
academics should not be allowed to undermine the integrity of the
overall results and the time has come to acknowledge that such distortions are a possibility.
My third proposal is that U.S. News should remove law school
deans from the pool of voters. This recommendation is not intended
to impugn in any way the integrity of the approximately 200 individuals who currently serve as deans at the nation’s accredited law
schools. Instead, the recommendation is based on the simple observation that it is unrealistic to expect law school deans to remain uninfluenced by the tremendous power the U.S. News rankings can exert
over their own careers. The U.S. News rankings have come to shape
and often dominate the way law school deans are evaluated by alumni, administrators, potential employers, students, and even faculty.149
A decline in an institution’s U.S. News ranking virtually guarantees
that there will be negative repercussions of some kind for that institution’s dean.150 A rise in the U.S. News rankings, by contrast, is a
147. In contrast to explicit bias, implicit bias consists of unconscious attitudes and
viewpoints that nonetheless affect decisionmaking and behavior. For a convenient summary of some of the most important literature regarding implicit bias, see Jerry Kang,
Mark Bennett, Devon Carbado, Pam Casey, Nilanjana Dasgupta, David Faigman, Rachel
Godsil, Anthony G. Greenwald, Justin Levinson & Jennifer Mnookin, Implicit Bias in the
Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1126 (2012) (“Using experimental methods in laboratory and field studies, researchers have provided convincing evidence that implicit biases
exist, are pervasive, are large in magnitude, and have real-world effects.”).
148. See supra note 79 (discussing Professor Seto’s recommendation that highest and
lowest 10% of the votes should be excluded from tabulations).
149. See, e.g., Leigh Jones, Law School Deans Feel Heat from Rankings, NAT’L L.J.,
May 3, 2006, at 6 (concluding that popularity of U.S. News rankings “means that deans can
expect the ranking scorecard increasingly to serve as a measure of their individual job
performance”); Sam Kamin, How the Blogs Saved Law School: Why a Diversity of Voices
Will Undermine the U.S. News & World Report Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 375, 377 (2006)
(“[N]early all deans would prefer to live in a world in which the U.S. News rankings are
given less importance by current and prospective law students, by alumni, faculty, and
central administration. Yet no dean can afford to refuse to cooperate with a system that all
of them detest.”).
150. See, e.g., Sauder & Espeland, supra note 2, at 23 (recounting dean’s observations
of “hysteria” that ensured at his/her institution from decline in U.S. News rankings); TAMANAHA, supra note 3, at 78 (“From 1990, when U.S. News began to issue a systematic
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boon to a dean’s position at his or her home institution and a potential source for lateral opportunities. Warranted or not, therefore, the
central importance of the U.S. News rankings to the lives and careers
of law school deans is a formidable challenge to the ability of these
individuals to remain sufficiently objective about the surveys. In
place of the deans, therefore, I propose that U.S. News broaden the
pool of respondents and make an effort to include faculty who are less
vested in the results of the rankings.151 Junior faculty, for example,
have been excluded altogether from the survey process.152 While junior faculty may possess less knowledge about the range of institutions being ranked, they also might be less swayed by the types of
strategic considerations that appear to be influencing senior faculty
and deans. Clinical faculty and emeriti have also been largely excluded from the pool of respondents, despite the fact that they often
possess an informed perspective on the academic quality of the institutions being surveyed. As a result, I would propose that U.S. News
remove deans from the survey process and replace them with two or
three additional faculty members to be chosen at random from the
complete lists of faculty members at the nation’s ABA accredited
schools. The addition of these new respondents in the survey pool
would diversify the results from year to year and likely mitigate some
of the distorting influences imposed by strategic considerations.153
In order to improve the ability of all faculty to make meaningful
assessments about the institutions being ranked, my fourth recommendation is based on a suggestion already offered by Brian Leiter.
In an open letter to the director of data research at U.S. News, Professor Leiter recently proposed that the U.S. News survey process be
converted to an online system in which a variety of objective criteria
and information be included in the descriptions of the law schools.154
This methodological improvement would increase the likelihood that
the surveys would be based on meaningful assessments rather than
emotional or intuitive factors. Among other things, voting faculty
annual ranking, its influence over law schools has grown enormously. . . . Multiple deans
have resigned after a drop in rank.”).
151. A similar query could be made as to whether the deans of academic affairs should
remain permanent members of the voting population. On the one hand, these individuals
are presumably knowledgeable about a significant number of institutions and less directly
influenced than the deans by the results of the U.S. News rankings. As high ranking members of their law school’s administration, however, it is likely that these individuals will be
susceptible to at least some of the same pressures endured by deans.
152. An academic is not eligible to receive a survey until they receive tenure. See Seto,
supra note 1, at 497 & n.26.
153. There are many ways in which the diversification of the survey pool could prove
beneficial to the results. At the very least, the inclusion of more individuals in the survey
process could help make the academic reputation scores reflective of a greater variety of
potentially relevant measures and contemporary observations.
154. See supra note 89.
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could be provided basic information about the scholarly productivity
of the faculty at each institution, the qualifications of the student
bodies, and some indicia of the institution’s success in teaching, such
as bar passage rates and the nature and extent of clinical opportunities provided.155 While there may be some disagreement about the
precise information and criteria that should be included in the survey, the inclusion of any empirical data would seem to constitute an
improvement over the current form of the surveys.
One could argue that these recommendations are unnecessary by
virtue of the personal integrity of the legal academics being surveyed.
To reiterate a prior point, however, these recommendations are not
premised on the notion that anyone in legal academia has consciously
manipulated the academic reputation scores for the purpose of institutional advancement. Such conscious manipulation has in fact occurred in other contexts related to the U.S. News rankings, but there
is no evidence that legal academics have been directly involved in the
scandals such as those at Illinois and Villanova and there is no evidence that anyone has ever consciously manipulated the academic
reputation scores.156 That being said, any survey of human beings
must account for the influence of strategic considerations and the
possibility of implicit or unconscious bias. The empirical data strongly suggests that strategic considerations have in fact influenced,
however subtly or unconsciously, the formulation of the academic
reputation scores over the past sixteen years. The irony is that the
magnetic pull of the U.S. News rankings is itself the most likely
cause for this distortion. The time has come, therefore, for the methodology of the U.S. News rankings to account for the current realities
of the world of legal education that it helped us create.

155. One starting place for considering the data that should be included in the surveys
would be Brian Leiter’s website. See Leiter, supra note 2. In his letter to U.S. News, for
example, Leiter proposed including a list of prominent alumni for each law school. See Leiter, supra note 7, at para. 5. Note also that a voting faculty member’s decision to consider
bar passage rates or the numeric qualifications of the student bodies in their assessment of
academic reputation would in itself constitute a form of the echo effect, since those criteria
already figure significantly in the U.S. News ranking methodology. See Morse & Flanigan,
supra note 6.
156. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.

